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The cover: An 1852 print by Yoshikazu depicting a famous episode from the career of the 12th-century samurai Sato Tadanobu in which he repelled some attackers with a go board. This is one of the most popular themes of go prints and has already been featured in different versions on the covers of GW13 and 46. *From the collection of John Power.*

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Go World News

Takemiya Rebuffs Yamashiro

Takemiya started the year disastrously by losing to Kobayashi in the Kisei title match and to Nie Weiping in the Japan-China Super Go Series, but he made a return to top form just in time for the Honinbo, the one title in which he really does justice to his great ability. This year he crushed the challenge of Yamashiro Hiroshi even more convincingly than last year, not even letting him take one game to save face.

The turning point of the series seems to have been the second game, in which Yamashiro took the lead on the first day only to have it upset on the second. Throughout the series, Yamashiro failed to display the tenacity in the late middle game that is his forte. In the final game also he played well on the first day, but was overhauled on the second and lost by half a point.

The good news for go fans is that Takemiya reverted to the large-moyo strategy that is indelibly associated with his name. Although the series was more one-sided than last year, Yamashiro did put up a fight. In fact, after Takemiya played the sanren-sei (three star-point stones in a row) pattern in the first and third

games, he countered with the same pattern himself in the fourth game, so we got to see how a sanren-sei expert handles himself when he's on the receiving end.

The results:

Game 1 (27, 28 May). Takemiya (B) won by $5\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game 2 (4, 5 June). Takemiya (W) won by resignation.

Game 3 (17, 18 June). Takemiya (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (25, 26 June). Takemiya (W) won by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

Kato Takes Gosei Title from Cho

Kato Masao is enjoying a second prime: he now has four titles, which rivals his best performance in his younger days. In fact, since one of the titles is the Meijin, he could be said to be at his peak. Takemiya, with three successive Honinbo titles under his belt, is also at the zenith of his career, so that leaves only one member of the Kitani School 'golden trio', Ishida Yoshio, out in the cold.

Kato added to his swag by defeating his nemesis Cho Chikun. In the past Kato has had



In top form, Takemiya takes his third successive Honinbo title and his fifth overall. This brings him level with Rin and Ishida; his targets now are matching Sakata's seven titles and Takagawa's nine.

12th Meijin League

Rank	Player	K	C	I	T	R	Y	F	O	S	Score	Place
1	Kobayashi K.	—	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	5 — 3	2
2	Cho Chikun	0	—	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	5 — 3	3
3	Ishida A.	0	0	—	1	1	1	0	1	0	4 — 4	4
4	Takemiya	1	0	0	—	1	1	0	1	0	4 — 4	5
5	Rin Kaiho	1	1	0	0	—	1	1	1	1	6 — 2	1
6	Yamashiro	0	0	0	0	0	—	1	0	1	2 — 6	—
7	Fujisawa S.	1	0	1	1	0	0	—	1	0	4 — 4	6
7	Otake	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	—	0	2 — 6	—
7	Shiraishi	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	—	4 — 4	6

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

more trouble against Cho than against any other player and has lost many an important game to him, but recently he finally seems to have overcome the Cho jinx. Last year he beat him in the Meijin league playoff and this year in the Judan playoff and in both cases went on to take the title. This time he recovered from a bad start in which he lost the first game to go on and sweep the next three. His victory gave Kato his third Gosei title and his 26th overall. He also holds the current Meijin, Judan, and Oza titles.

Rin Meijin Challenger

After a tough struggle in this year's Meijin league, Rin Kaiho has emerged as the challenger for the 12th Meijin title. Rin was leading after six rounds, as reported in our previous issue, but then he stumbled by dropping a point to Ishida Akira, so Cho Chikun drew level. Everything was decided in the final round, played on 29 August, when Rin won his game against Shiraishi and Cho lost to his arch-rival Kobayashi Koichi.

A close match is expected between Rin and the title-holder Kato, as their past results are almost even. Rin has a particular fondness for the Meijin title — during the 14 terms that it was sponsored by the Yomiuri he won the title seven times and also won it once after it switched to the Asahi newspaper, for a record total of eight. If he does make a comeback, it will be his fourth.

Four players ended with a 4–4 score; of these, the two lower-ranked players, Fujisawa Shuko (who defeated Takemiya in the final

round) and Shiraishi will fight a playoff to see who stays in the league.



Liu 8-dan

China Leads in 3rd Super Go Series

The above heading will come as no news to regular readers: everyone recognizes that Japan is the top go-playing country, no one can explain why it can't win the Super Go series. Once again China looks like taking the honours and this time it has a new hero: Liu Xiaoguang 8-dan, who has beaten four players and given China a 5–1 lead. Liu has disposed of Miyazawa 7-dan, Ishii Kunio 9-dan, Kobayashi Satoru 8-dan (the star for the Japanese side in the 2nd series), and Kudo Norio 9-dan.

Two New 9-dans in China

Immediately after the Japanese touring team completed its goodwill tour of China (see GW48,

page 4), the annual Chinese promotion tournament began in Wuhan City. In this two-week tournament, held from 10 to 23 June, two new players emerged as 9-dan, making a total of six resident 9-dans in China (one has emigrated to Australia). The two are Qian Yuping and Jiang Zhujiu (the star of the 1st Super Go series).

Shuko's Private Tour of China

Every year Fujisawa Shuko makes a private tour of China. In March this year he took 19 young Japanese professionals with him, making his biggest group so far. They played five goodwill matches with Chinese players and managed to come out on top with 51 wins to 43 losses and 1 jigo.

Japan—China Friendship Games

To commemorate the inauguration of routes from Tokyo to Beijing and Dalian, All-Japan Airlines sponsored two goodwill games between Chinese and Japanese players. The first was played in April in Tokyo between Sakata Eio, Honorary Honinbo, and Tsao Dayuan 9-dan of China, and the result was a victory for the latter.

Japan took its revenge in June, when Kataoka Satoshi 8-dan defeated Ma Xiaochun 9-dan in a game played in the Beijing Gymnasium on 28 June. Kataoka has now won four games in a row against Ma, the number two Chinese player.

Kong Loses Final Game in Igo Club Series

In the final game in the special series sponsored by *Igo Club* pitting Kong Shangming 8-dan, the wife of Nie Weiping and herself one of the top Chinese players, against five young Japanese professionals, Kong was defeated by Hikosaka Naoto 7-dan, making her score 1–4 for the series. This is not up to her usual standard, but then her main object in coming to Japan was to study Japanese and in this she had greater success, achieving reasonable fluency in conversation in her half-year stay.

1986 World Amateur Champion Turns Professional

Chan Ka Yui of Hong Kong, the winner of last year's World Amateur Go Championship, has become a professional go player at the Kansai Ki-in. He made his debut on 20 May as a 5-dan and quickly proved that this rating was conservative by winning his first six games in a row, including victories over two 9-dans, Honda Kunihisa and Ushikubo Yoshitaka. This performance is an

indication of the high level of amateur go in the Orient.



Ohira Shuzo 9-dan

Ohira's Winning Streak

Ohira Shuzo 9-dan (aged 57) has just completed the second 17-game winning streak of his career. The first was in 1960, when he was an 8-dan; the second lasted from mid-February to early August. Ohira is known for his powerful fighting style, and the fact that he forced his opponents to resign in every game testifies to his strength. The next task for Ohira is to defeat Liu in the 3rd Japan—China Super Go series.

12th Kisei Tournament

The first stage of this tournament was completed on 25 June, when Cho Chikun defeated Sakata Eio by half a point to win the 9-dan section. With 66 9-dans competing, this is the most hotly contested section of the Kisei title and it is like a major tournament in its own right. Sakata, who turned 67 on 15 February this year, showed that he is far from being a spent force by winning his way to the playoff. Just before this game Sakata had won three half-pointers, but this time the luck went the other way.

Cho won the 9-dan section on his first appearance; in the early days of the Kisei he won the 7- and 8-dan sections once each, but since achieving promotion to 9-dan he has either been Kisei (three terms) or seeded in the final stage as the holder of another title.

Winners (dans are given when the player has subsequently been promoted) of the dan-sections were:

- 1-dan: Okumura Yasushi 2-dan
- 2-dan: Mimura Tomoyasu 3-dan
- 3-dan: Nishimura Keiji 4-dan

4-dan: Cho Sonjin
 5-dan: Komatsu Hideki 6-dan
 6-dan: Yoda Norimoto
 7-dan: O Meien; 2nd: Imamura Toshiya
 8-dan: O Rissei; 2nd: Hasegawa Sunao
 9-dan: Cho Chikun; 2nd: Sakata Eio; 3rd:

Shiraishi, Awaji.

Of the players to 6-dan, Yoda has survived the knockout and won a place in the main section of the second stage.

Oza Challenger: Rin or Cho?

Rin and Cho have won their way through the pack in the 35th Oza title and will meet in a playoff to decide who challenges Kato. Cho defeated Yamashiro, Takemiya, and O Rissei in the final round, while Rin disposed of Ishida Akira, Oya Koichi, and Fujisawa Shuko. Incidentally, Shuko has been having a fairly good year, with 11 wins to 6 losses to date, but his Oza performance is typical of his recent form: he always falls just one or two steps short of becoming the challenger for a title.

9th Quebec Open

The winner of the 9th Quebec Open and the new Quebec Champion is Yuzo Ota 5-dan of Montreal, who defeated all his opponents. The last time a player won the tournament with such an impressive score was in 1981, when Bruce Amos won the 3rd Quebec Open. Another player who achieved a perfect score of six wins is Bruce Nolin 3-kyu of Ottawa.

Organized by the Association Quebecoise des Joueurs de Go, the tournament was held in Montreal on 16, 17 May 1987. It attracted a total of 41 players, of whom 23 were from out of town: Ottawa/Hull, 15; Quebec City region, 6; and Toronto, 2. (*Report from Steven J.C. Mays*)

Computer Go Magazine

In GW47 we announced the founding of the first international magazine devoted to developments in computer go. We are happy to be able to report that *Computer Go* is healthy and has now put out its third issue (Summer 1987). Already the first issue is out of print, but there are some copies of the second issue remaining. Readers who want to get in on the ground floor of this new venture are urged to subscribe now. The rate is \$10 per year (four issues) and \$12 outside

North America (Canada is Can\$12) and checks should be made payable to *Computer Go* and sent to the editor, who is:

David W. Erbach
 71 Brixford Crescent
 Winnipeg, Manitoba R2N 1E1, Canada.



The 1987 European Champion

Macfadyen Wins European Championship

The 31st European Go Championship, held in Grenoble from 25 July to 8 August, was won by Matthew Macfadyen of Great Britain. The tournament system was changed this year, with the top four place-getters in the main tournament (in which there were about 350 competitors) gaining places in the semifinals. The top qualifier was Lazarev 6-dan of the U.S.S.R., who scored seven wins out of a possible eight. He was joined by Macfadyen, Rob van Zeijst (Holland/Tokyo), and Frederik Donzet (France), who all scored six wins. In the semifinals, Lazarev beat van Zeijst and Macfadyen beat Donzet; Macfadyen then triumphed in the final to win his second European Championship. Lazarev's second place was the best performance yet by a player from his country. After discoing all night, van Zeijst and Donzet decided to forgo a playoff and share third place.

The first European Computer Go Championship was also held. The 19x19 section was won by Janusz Kraszek's *Star of Poland*.

Spring Tournaments in Europe

—Report by Peter Dijkema—

Here are some results from the main tournaments held in Europe in spring this year.

The traditional Hannover Messe weekend

tournament was won by Jurgen Mattern 6-dan of Berlin, who was European Champion for most of the 70's. He won all five of his games. The local favourite, Lutz Mattner 5-dan, came second with four wins. A record number of 152 players participated. Hiroshima, the sister city of Hannover, sent over Yamada Takizo 6-dan, a teaching professional, to give game commentaries and play simultaneous games. One week later Yamada Sensei also visited the Paris tournament

The three-day Paris Easter tournament also attracted a record number of players: 282 from nine European and four Far Eastern countries. Among them were 65 players with dan ratings, including 17 players of the top European class (i.e. 4-dan and stronger, 4-dan being the entry level to qualify for the European Championship).

In the second round of the Easter tournament, Robert Rehm 5-dan of Amsterdam pulled off a surprising win against the favourite, Yoo Jong-Su 6-dan of Cologne. In the fourth round, Rehm lost to Andre Moussa, who happens to be the only European with a tolerable (though still negative) score against Yoo. A few years ago he even defeated Yoo three times within the space of one year. This time Moussa lost again but won the tournament, thanks to a better sum of opponents' scores. The results:

- 1st: Andre Moussa (France)
- 2nd: Robert Rehm (Holland)
- 3rd: Yoo Jong-Su (W. Germany/Korea)
- 4th: Maeda 5-dan (Paris/Japan)

All the above had five wins. Jurgen Mattern won the lightning tournament, defeating Rehm in the final game.

The Amsterdam tournament is a four-day, six-round tournament. This year Amsterdam also set new records in the quantity (238) and quality (70 dan-players, 20 of them top class) of participants. Yoo Jong-Su won all of his games, just like the last two years. In the 30 games he has played in this tournament to date, Yoo has only lost once (to Moussa in 1984). Wolfgang Isele 5-dan of West Germany came second with five

wins. Ex-pro Manfred Wimmer 6-dan of Vienna won the lightning tournament, defeating Arnoud Rutgers van der Loeff 1-kyu of Arnhem, Holland, in the final game.

Being the top European tournaments, Paris and Amsterdam were chosen to organize separate youth tournaments to select the representatives for the World Youth Amateur Championship in Hong Kong in the summer. In Paris seven competitors played four rounds. Oliver Schmidt and Peter von Milczewski, both shodans from West Germany, and Farid Ben Malek 2-dan of Grenoble tied for first place. A few weeks later they fought it out during a tournament in Rahlstadt in West Germany, and von Milczewski won. The other two players tried their luck again in the Amsterdam tournament, in which the place for the second European representative was at stake. They were joined by only two other competitors, Bernd-Jan Buit 3-dan and Andre Alfenaar 1-kyu, both of Holland. Bernd-Jan qualified by winning all his games.

Finally, on Whitsun weekend both the Castle Tournament of Nantes and the Cologne Team Tournament were played.

The Nantes tournament (6-8 June) is played according to the 'increased handicap' system, i.e. playing an opponent with fewer wins means giving extra handicap stones. Such tournaments are hardly ever won with perfect scores, but that didn't bother Yoo Jong-Su, who won all seven of his games. Simon Lavallou 2-dan of France came second with six wins, and Richard Zwiers 2-dan of Amsterdam came third with five wins. There were 132 competitors.

The Cologne tournament is for teams of four players from the same region or city whose rating is at least 3-dan. This year for the first time a team from a Russian city, Leningrad, participated. The winner was Vienna, whose members were Hasibeder, Wimmer, Wiltschek, all 6-dan, and Scheid 4-dan.

Second was 'Provincie'-Holland (Frank Janssen 5-dan, Michiel Eijkhout, Tonny Claasen and Joost Cremers, all 4-dan). Third was Hamburg.

Pro v. Pro Blindfold Go

White: Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan

Black: Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan

Komi: 5½. Time: 15 minutes each, followed by 30 seconds byo-yomi per move.

The game below, played on 21 February this year in a hall in the Citizen's Culture Centre in the city of Amagasaki before a highly appreciative audience, had an unusual twist: both the players were blindfolded. Actually it may well be unique: as far as we know, it is the first blindfold game ever played between professionals in public. It's quite possible that some players have experimented with this form of go in private, but if so it has never been reported on. A number of years ago Hane 9-dan played blindfolded against an amateur 4-dan, who was allowed to look at the board, but the amateur took only a two-stone handicap, which must have taken much of the burden off the professional. The game below is a first because it was played in the same way as an ordinary professional game — except that the players had to visualize the 361 intersections in their heads.

When you think of the prodigious feats of chess masters, some of whom can take on dozens of opponents simultaneously in blindfold play, it seems strange that there has been so little interest in blindfold go. The reason is quite simply that most players have dismissed the idea out of hand as absurd. In chess there is basically only one battle the player has to keep track

of in his mind, and — the really crucial point — the game becomes simplified as it progresses. Not only is the opposite true in go, you also have the added complication of ko fights to contend with. The difficulty of keeping track of ko fights, in which repetitive captures occur on the same point, seems to be the reason why most professionals have avoided the challenge.

Because the Kansai Ki-in is number two in Japan, it sometimes tries harder. It has pioneered various projects, such as pro v. pro handicap games, pro v. pro 9x9 games and so on, and this year their publicity section came up with the idea of blindfold go. Moreover, rather than calling on young professionals around 20, let's say, whose powers of memory could be expected to be at their peak, they selected their top two players, who happen to be middle-aged, for the experiment.

The reader can judge for himself whether the game is any different from an ordinary professional game. Black 55 shows that the players are not frightened of getting into a complicated fight. The way White lived in the bottom right corner (94 sets up a connection with 'a') indicates how well the players are reading.

Unfortunately it had been arranged beforehand that the game would be suspended at a set time, but both players claimed they were confident they could have played it to the end.

Play suspended after 104 moves.




Figure 1 (1 – 54)




Figure 2 (55 – 104)

11th Kisei Title

The 1987 Kisei title match was a triumph for Kobayashi Koichi, a disaster for Takemiya Masaki and a bit of a disappointment for go fans. Takemiya contributed to one of the most interesting title clashes of recent years when he challenged Cho for the Kisei title in 1985, but against Kobayashi he seems to be able to do nothing right. Perhaps the problem is that he has too little respect for Kobayashi's style. Before the match and during it Kobayashi had to put up with a number of insults from Takemiya. For example, in an interview in the March issue of *Igo Club* before the match started, Takemiya delivered himself of the following opinion:

'I'm sorry to say this, but with his kind of game it's regrettable that he's Kisei. I don't want to have go fans thinking that it's OK to play like that, so I have to beat him and settle the issue. In a word, his go is like the subway. You get where you want to go, but you don't see any scenery.'

Kobayashi also had to listen to statements in a similar vein at the parties held on the eve of each game, but he resisted the temptation to reply in kind. Instead, he reserved his answer for the go board and here he proved more eloquent than Takemiya. He raced to a three-game lead, at which point it looked as if the series would be a shutout like the Judan title match between the two last year. Takemiya managed to save a bit of

face by picking up a win in the fourth game, but it was only a momentary reprieve, for Kobayashi wrapped the series up in the fifth game. When it came to the crunch, Takemiya was not able to deliver on his boast.

The most puzzling thing about the series was that Takemiya did not play with his usual flair. It was not simply a question of his being in bad form; rather, he seemed to lack his usual confidence in his large-scale centre style, in stark contrast to his verbal confidence. One possible explanation, suggested by the editor of *Kido*, is that Kobayashi has taken his measure — as a player and as a man. In fact, Kobayashi's victory was so complete that one wonders if Takemiya will ever be able to make a comeback against him.

Igo Club interviewed Kobayashi in its May issue, after the series was over, and offered him a forum to reply to Takemiya's criticisms. Kobayashi declined, presumably on the grounds that he had just completed his refutation on the go board, but he did have a number of interesting comments on the individual games. We will refer to these at the end of each commentary.

Our coverage of the title match begins with a report from our man on the spot, Bob Terry, on the first game, which was played in Los Angeles.

The Kisei Title in Los Angeles Report by Bob Terry

The first game of the premier tournament event of 1987 featured a rematch between the contestants for last year's Judan title, Kobayashi Koichi Kisei and Takemiya Masaki Honinbo, but in a unique setting; the opponents vying for the title, as well as an entourage that included members of the elite of the go world, accompanied by a group of amateurs from Japan, arrived in California to commemorate the occasion of the first top tournament game to be played outside the Orient. The game site was the New Otani Hotel in Little Tokyo in downtown Los Angeles, and local television news stations, both English and Japanese, sent crews to cover the story. In addition, hundreds of fans turned out to see the action, some from as far away as San Francisco and San Diego.

At the welcoming banquet, the Consul General of Japan, Watanabe Taizo, commended the sponsors, the Yomiuri newspaper, the Nihon Ki-in and the Kansai Ki-in, for their diligence and expertise in ensuring the success of this event. Irobe Yoshiaki, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Nihon Ki-in, spoke of the significant intercultural aspects of events like this that the Nihon Ki-in is eager to cultivate. But perhaps the most entertaining and thought-provoking remarks were made by the grand old master of go, Hashimoto Uтаро 9-dan, Chairman of the Kansai Ki-in.

He prefaced his speech by saying that Mr. Irobe of the Nihon Ki-in had summed up the matter so completely that he had nothing to add. 'Mr. Irobe has played out the opening, the



The start of the 1987 Kisei title match. Kobayashi nigris to see who has black (Kobayashi has picked up a handful of white stones, Takemiya places one stone on the board, so if there is an odd number of white stones, he plays black – that is what happened). Watching are Irobe Yoshiaki (centre left) and Hashimoto Utaro (centre). Rin can be seen to the right of Takemiya.

This was the 33rd game between Takemiya and Kobayashi; till now the honours had been fairly even, with Takemiya scoring 15 wins to Kobayashi's 17, but Kobayashi had won the only previous title match they contested, the 24th Judan in 1986, 3–0. At 36, Takemiya is one and a half years older than Kobayashi, and he became professional shodan in the same year, 1965, that Kobayashi entered the Kitani school. Kobayashi made shodan in 1967 and reached 9-dan in 1979, two years after Takemiya.

middle game and the endgame. What is left for me except to fill in the dame?" The 80-year-old Hashimoto went on to say that instead of an official speech he would give a personal viewpoint of what it meant for him to come to the United States at this time in his life.

'In 1923 I was just 15 years old and studying go with my teacher, the late Segoe Kensaku, when the great earthquake struck Tokyo. It goes without saying that my family's humble home was devastated, but the whole city, as far as the eye could see, was leveled as well. One thing I remember, though: in our misery and desperation, while we were wondering where our next meal would come from, a ship suddenly landed on our shores, an American ship, bringing food

and supplies. My heart warmed at the sight of that ship and I have never forgotten the feeling.

'Then in 1941 Japan and America became mortal enemies. Four years later I was playing the second game of the 1945 Honinbo match, held on the outskirts of Hiroshima, when all of a sudden a blinding flash filled the sky. It was the atomic bomb. Again I saw a city leveled and the destruction and misery that resulted. I couldn't help asking myself why such a "bad move" had been played.'

The pun ("bad move") was intended. But Hashimoto went on to say he fully realized how that act had effectively ended the war and that the American occupation gave Japan a new lease on life. He hinted that the 'bad move' contained

within it the seeds of the success that Japan is now enjoying. Concluding on an upbeat note, Hashimoto declared that he was happy to finally visit America.

A number of other people spoke next, including Kato Masao, Meijin, the official observer for the first game, and Rin Kaiho 9-dan, the Yomiuri commentator. Of course the players themselves also offered their own remarks on the venue and their predictions for the next day's game.

Takemiya said that this match, spanning the globe as it did, boded well for his own patented 'cosmic go.' Ever the optimist, he added: 'I've just enjoyed two wonderful days of golf here in sunny California, which has put me right in the mood for picking up the win!'

Kobayashi pointed out that he is often characterized as playing a stingy, territory-oriented style of go. 'But how could I play in such a way here in America, which is famous for its wide, open spaces?' (He went on the next day to play his usual stingy, territory-oriented go.)

Both players looked healthy and well rested, showing no signs of jet lag from the nine-hour flight from Japan. (After the game Kobayashi complained that jet lag had indeed been a factor and that he had felt drowsy as he played.) All indications pointed toward a memorable start for this historic match.

The next morning the players, the official observer, the recorder, the timekeeper and others gathered in a Japanese-style tatami room on the fourth floor of the hotel for the first day's play. After several moves had been made, professional go players and writers assembled in the room next door to analyse the game. An in-house television system had been set up beforehand with the camera trained on the players and the board, and this shot of the scene was shown on a monitor in the analysis room. The same shot was also shown on another monitor in a banquet room in another part of the hotel for public viewing.

It was in this banquet room that Rin Kaiho began his commentary after the dinner break on the second day. The game had proceeded at a rather brisk pace and by that time more than 120 moves had been played. About 125 Japanese, Chinese, Korean and American amateurs watched Rin lecture using a large demonstration board with the television monitor to one side of him.

The commentary given below is based on Rin's remarks at that time, supplemented by comments made by Michael Redmond, who also translated Rin's commentary simultaneously for the English-speaking members of the audience. In addition, Los Angeles's own professional go player Jimmy Cha 4-dan commented on the game a few days later and his suggestions have been incorporated here.

White: Kobayashi Koichi, Kisei, Judan & Tengen

Black: Takemiya Masaki, Honinbo

Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each.

Played on 12,13 January 1987 in Los Angeles.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1 – 36)

Figure 1 (1 – 36). Power in the center


White 12. If he plays this kakari closer to the corner, at the 5–3 or 5–4 point, Black will squeeze him with a pincer on the right and build up both that side and the bottom. When the kakari is farther from the corner, Black cannot attack as severely.

Black still tries to apply pressure to White with the pincer of 13, but now White can counter with 14 to take sente with the variation to Black 21. This is an unusual variation but it is occasionally seen; for instance, Kato Meijin played this way a few months before against Yamashiro Hiroshi in the Meijin league.

The typical joseki move, the attachment of White 1 in Dia. 1, is not good in this situation,



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

because Black will not play the typical joseki response, the hane at 3, but counter with the powerful move at 2. After White 3, Black builds up thickness that works well with his stones on the lower side. If this sequence concludes with White exchanging 5 for Black 6, the result is the same as if the star-point joseki in Dia. 2 had been played. This is a favorite variation of Takemiya's so it is only natural that Kobayashi would seek to avoid such a result.


Black 23 is a natural move. He would like to play 'a', but then White would take the initiative by attacking at 'b'. Similarly, Black would prefer to answer White 24 by playing at 28, but then White would play at 'c', forcing Black 'd', and use his sente to take the big point of 'e' in the upper left corner.

Instead, Black plays 25 and 27, thick moves typical of Takemiya's style, which aim at building territory in the center with a move at 'f' next. However, these are slow moves that allow White to take the initiative in the upper right corner by attacking at 28. (Note that White's group below is safe because of the peep at 'g'.)

Black 29. According to the joseki books, Black should attach on the stronger side, that is, at 1 in Dia. 3, in order to make White overconcentrated with the moves to 6. But here that is not good, as it lets White settle his group; Black intends to initiate a simultaneous attack on White's group on the lower right side and the two



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

stones here, so strengthening him as in this diagram would eliminate that possibility. That is why Black plays 29: he wants to build up power before making his attack.

The point is that moves such as Black 'a', 'b', 'c', and of course others in Dia. 4 threaten to kill White's lower group. If Black can use this aji effectively, he can look forward to profiting on both sides.




Figure 2 (37 - 53)


Figure 2 (37 - 53). Losing moves

The sequence initiated by Black 29 in the last figure ends with White 38 and is par for this position.

With 39 Black attacks in the most straightforward manner. Black plays 41 as an indirect attack on the white group below. However, Black 43 is a mistake. This is a thin move that not only invites White to play a couple of forcing moves but also gives him the opportunity later to spring a brilliant tesuji on Black. He should have played 43 at 'a'; the loss from 43 is about equal to komi, so it is close to being the losing move.

Black 45 and 47 are sente, forcing White to play at 52 in order to live, but before he does so, he makes the forcing moves of 48 and 50.

According to Jimmy Cha, Black 53 is the losing move. Perhaps Takemiya was concerned about giving up profit in the corner, but it was imperative that he play 1 in Dia. 5 (next page). If White takes the corner with 2 and 4, Black forces with 5, 7 and 9 and then makes a placement at 11. With this sequence Black not



only takes profit but also builds considerable thickness.

Instead of this, White would have to answer Black 1 with 2 in Dia. 6 and Black would end up creating a thick position in the center.

Rin noted that after Black 53, White can aim at taking the corner away from him with the sequence in Dia. 7. If, however, White has first exchanged 1 for Black 2 in Dia. 8 (this is after the 54–55 exchange in the next figure), the attachment at 3 does not work. The tesuji of Black 6 squelches White's play in the corner.




Figure 3 (54 – 81). *A sparkling tesuji*

Rin speculated that Takemiya played Black 55 in order to induce White to exchange 58 for 59 and thereby eliminate the problems in the corner. He added that Takemiya might have overlooked White's reply. Rin went on to say that Takemiya appeared in the analysis room at one point around this stage in the game mumbling about how poorly he was playing.

White 56 is a sparkling tesuji: the moves to Black 65 are forced and White bursts out into the center.

But, according to Rin, Black 67 is the move that gives Black a lost position. He should have played 1 in Dia. 9. White must connect at 2 and, if play continues to Black 7 as in the game, Black reduces White's territory, as well as his potential eye space, and cutting at 'a' becomes a significant





Figure 3 (54 – 81)



Dia. 9

threat. Moreover, if White exchanges 'b' for 'c' and captures at 'd' in order to parry this threat, Black's thickness in the lower central area is enhanced.

When White turns to 74 he is already ahead by 5 or 6 points. There is no way Black can give White 5½ points komi and win.

Black 81. The sealed move.

Figure 4 (82 – 130). *Locked in mortal combat*

White 88 is a mistake, according to Jimmy Cha. He should play at 1 in Dia. 10. Black is forced to attach with 2 and extend to 4 and then White encloses a large territory on the upper side with 5. However, the sequence in the game does allow White to preserve his advantage, since he takes sente to turn to 94.

At this point Black is compelled to play 97 to 101 in order to hold White's territory to a manageable scale and retain the potential of his own territory. White 102, on the other hand, is a restrained move that indicated that Kobayashi was






Figure 4 (82 - 130)



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

convinced at this point of the superiority of his own position. Pushing down at 104, securing the top, would have been a good alternative.

Black 103. Black continues to play all out. This is the only area left for Black to start a fight.

Rin said that White's reply at 104 is a solid and steady move and not necessarily bad but that White 1 in Dia. 11 is strongest here. If Black 2, White can link underneath with 3 and 5; if Black captures a stone with 6, White forces with 7 to 13, then strikes at the vital point of the other group with 15. White gains too much in the centre from attacking this group, so Black will have to compromise with 3 at 9. Note that if Black plays 10 at 11, White pushes down with


'a', Black 19, White 18, Black 'b'; White then strikes at 15, and the black group is unlikely to survive.

White continues to apply pressure to Black's group with 106 and 108. He plans to build up strength so that he can reduce or invade Black's lower central area.

Black 111 is a mistake. It is a thick move but Black should play at 'a', taking territory and preventing White's monkey jump to 'b'.

White 112 threatens Black's weak group from afar. Since Black has only one eye in the upper left corner he is forced to defend at 113. This gives White the opportunity to play 114 and 116.

Black plays 117 to 121 in order to induce White 122, giving him the impetus to defend at 123. Note that if White answers 117 at 2 in Dia. 12, he falls into a trap, as Black can now cut at 3. The continuation to 9 is perfect for Black.



Dia. 12

With White 124 and Black 125, neither player gives an inch, and after White 130 they are locked in a battle that will decide the outcome of the game.

Kisei Prize Money

First prize: ¥26,000,000 (about \$184,000)

Second prize: ¥5,500,000

Match fees – Title-holder: ¥8,000,000

Challenger: ¥5,000,000

Playoff – Winner: ¥2,800,000

Loser: ¥800,000

Beginning with the 10th Kisei, the Second Stage of the tournament, a kind of knockout tournament between the winners of the dan sections, was incorporated into the Third Stage, so now the tournament consists of just two stages: the Dan Championships and the Tournament to Decide the Top Player (the title match is the culmination of this stage).






Figure 5 (131 - 174)

54: ko; 56: connects



Dia. 13

15: at 9; 16: at 11; 22: at 9; 24: at 2



Dia. 14


Figure 5 (131 - 174). An unnecessary ko

Black 37 is essential: if he plays at 38 White will connect at 50 and win the race to capture by one move.


White also has no choice for 38. If he connects at 1 in Dia. 13, Black has the tesuji of 2, which leads to a ko.

Black 43. If Black descends at 1 in Dia. 14, he can capture half the group, but this is not enough, as the other half lives with 6. Attempting to kill White with 7 etc. backfires.

White 48. If he had connected at 50 instead the game would have been over. Black can play 4 in Dia. 15 and pick up a few stones, but White wins the race to capture. White cannot afford to connect at 2 in Dia. 16 since Black has the tesuji of 5, which leads to White's destruction.



Dia. 15




Dia. 16

Actually White could also have played 48 at 'a' in Dia. 15. Kobayashi had two winning moves to choose from and he took neither.

Rin was stunned as he watched White 48 and the following moves appear on the television monitor since he had gone to some length to demonstrate how the connection of White 50 would win the game. He wondered out loud why White would want to play ko. Finally he shrugged and commented that White was far enough ahead and had enough ko threats that he could afford to play this way. When Black captured White's group in the lower right with 55 and 57, Rin added that in order to get back in the game Black would have to kill White's group in the upper right as well.

Ironically enough, Black is actually given that chance when White plays 60. Instead of answering at 61, he should destroy White's eye shape with 1 in Dia. 17. Since Black has captured White's group on the lower right, his own group is secure and he can launch an attack on White's group above without restraint. The continuation here is one possibility, given by Kato. Actually from 8 on, the two sides would be fighting the ko at 23 as they played out this variation, but we have simplified the sequence here. Black might not be able to win this ko, but Kobayashi himself said after the game that what with the way he had been playing before this, there was no guarantee that he would play correctly here. In short, Black 1 in this diagram was Takemiya's last chance to make a grab for victory.



Dia. 17

After White lives with 66 this last chance to win disappears for Black. (Incidentally, the problem would not have arisen if White had used 58, which is not necessary, to play at 66.)

At the end of this figure Rin paused to estimate the balance of territories. He calculated that Black's territory amounted to approximately 85 points while White's added up to more than 80 points, not counting the territory in his group on the upper side. In other words, considering the komi, White had the game won and the size of the win would be determined by the number of points his group on the upper side contained.




Figure 6 (175 - 243)

*101: connects (at 90); 109: ko (left of 94);
143: connects (at 106)*

Figure 6 (175 - 243). *Short of a masterpiece*

Rin continued to analyse the endgame, constantly revising his estimate of the score. His first impression was that White was ahead by close to ten points on the board. As he was pressed by the audience for a more precise count he began to amend that figure downward. By move 93 in this figure he had corrected his estimate to 'around five points on the board.'

One of the amateurs in the audience, Dr. Richard Dolen, suggested that the game 'fell somewhat short of a masterpiece.' Rin smiled and pointed out that hotly contested games, important games with much prestige riding on them, rarely turn out to be masterpieces. The opponents in such cases often let their emotions get the better of them and play spirited moves without judging the consequences fully.

As the endgame wound down, Rin excused himself in order to be present at the close of the game. At that point Michael Redmond took over and answered questions posed to him in both Japanese and English. He was asked how many points White was ahead on the board. 'It doesn't look as if White is ahead on the board at all now,' he replied. 'Rin and I at first only estimated Black as having three points in the upper central area where he now has ten points. Also, we seem to have overestimated the territory White would get on the upper side.'

At this point the players had completed filling in the dame and were seen on the monitor discussing the game, with Rin and Kato at the side of the board offering their own comments. Takemiya appeared sad and disappointed while Kobayashi beamed with delight.

One of the first things pointed out during this postgame discussion was the move at 150 in Figure 5 which would have decided the game at once.

Kobayashi cried out, 'Wha-!' and the color drained from his face.

'That's right,' Takemiya said with a chuckle. 'I was ready to resign, but since you were kind enough to make that mistake, I decided to play it out to the end.'

The analysis after the game continued for an hour, a rare occurrence when these two players finish a game.

It may not have been a masterpiece but this game was a vivid and exciting one for the fans in attendance. It surely aroused a great deal of



Both players made a shaky start, but fortune smiled on Kobayashi.

interest in the outcome of this match.

White wins by 4½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 35 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 37 minutes.

Kobayashi's Summing-up

Igo Club: Takemiya didn't play the sanren-sei.

Kobayashi: Yes, that surprised me.

Igo Club: Had you prepared a counterstrategy for the sanren-sei and the large moyo?

Kobayashi: More or less. I thought that I succeeded in the fuseki of this game. Black wanted to take the initiative on the right side, yet White took control, playing the two-space extension [22 and 24] and the second kakari at the top [28]. It took Black too many moves to seal White in [with 23 to 27].

Igo Club: But Black expands his bottom area and may have been satisfied.

Kobayashi: That's the point. There were a lot of fusekis in this series in which we were both satisfied. We just don't mesh.

Igo Club: You had an extraordinary oversight in the endgame.

Kobayashi: I was startled. As a rule, you lose when you make a mistake like that, but I was lucky. Even after that, I don't know if I could have saved the group on the right if Black had made a really spirited attempt to catch it [i.e. Dia. 17].

Game Two

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 18, 19 January 1987 at Lake Toya Spa in Hokkaido.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1 – 38)

Figure 1 (1 – 38). *Takemiya's uncharacteristic fuseki*

Black 9. Black 1 in Dia. 1 is the Kobayashi style – he has played the joseki here many times against Kato – but it gives White influence, so he avoids it against Takemiya.



Dia. 1

White 10. Takemiya avoids the usual move of 'b' — perhaps he thought that Kobayashi might answer with Black 10 instead of Black 11. Takemiya's next move, 12, is the standard follow-up to White 'b', but it is very unusual in combination with White 10.

White 16, 18. Takemiya showed none of his characteristic flair in this game, and his play was criticized from early in the fuseki by his fellow professionals, who were baffled by how low he was playing. These were the first two moves to puzzle the observers. They go for territory but at the cost of giving Black a good atari at 19, normally the kind of move Takemiya hates to give the opponent. Usually he would make a pincer at 'c', forcing Black to enter the corner at 28. This would let White build a moyo, but in that case White 6 would be in the wrong position — White 'd' would be superior. That being the case, one would expect White 16 at 'e'; the standard joseki of Black 'f', White 28, Black 'g' would follow, whereupon White could extend to 'h'.

Black is satisfied with the result to 29. White 30 is essential, so Black can now nip White's moyo in the bud with 31. (If Black played elsewhere, White would jump to 36.)

White 38 is solid but conservative. Otake advocated playing at 'h' instead. As it turned out, 'h' was one of the key points of the game.

Figure 2 (39 – 85). *Who's attacking whom?*

White 42. Takemiya must have been unhappy to find himself playing on the second line once again, but he had no choice. If White keeps pushing along from 40, he only helps Black to solidify his bottom area. When he plays 45, however, Black has attained his objective in attacking with 39.

White 46 and Black 47 are miai, so once again it might have been a good idea for White to play at 'a'. White 46 aims at the invasion at 48, but that does not really worry Black.






Figure 2 (39 – 85)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

White 54 was keenly regretted by Takemiya. 'The cut was premature,' he said. 'I had to play an approach move at 'a'.' As previously mentioned, this was one of the key points of the opening.

Black 57 was much praised by other professionals. This move is surprising, as it seems to be too close to the white wall, but it actually works well here. Letting Black block White off with 61 next would be unbearable, so White must play 58, whereupon Black 59 makes good shape at the top.

White 60 aims at attacking the black group to the left, but Black 61 is a sharp counterattack.

White 62, the sealed move, looks like a very patient move, but White has nothing better. If White 1 in Dia. 2, Black cuts off the white stone below with 2 and 4. This would lose. If instead White 1 in Dia. 3, Black still stops him from linking up and his stones are heavier than in the figure.

White 66 attempts to make some eye shape, but this is an ironic turnaround: White meant to attack Black with 60, but now he is the one under fire. White 74 and 76 help Black to solidify

his side territory, but White must feel that he has no choice. Up to 82 he does get something like eye shape and also keeps sente.





Figure 3 (86 - 113)



10: connects

Figure 3 (86 - 113). Roles reversed

White 86. It's hard to believe that this is a Takemiya game. Black answers calmly with 87 and up to 94 White gains nothing. Of course, the higher invasion of 86 at 89 would be risky — Black would jump to 101 and if White fled into the centre Black would engineer a double attack on this and the centre group, which is still not completely safe.

Perhaps Takemiya overlooked Black's effective answer at 87. If Black just plays 1 in Dia. 4, White destroys the bottom area with 2 to 6.

Black 95 is very severe: Black is setting about

deciding the game. In the ensuing exchange he cuts off a stone and secures a large centre territory. An observer could be forgiven for thinking that Black was Takemiya.

White 96. The usual sabaki tesuji (tesuji for making shape for a group under attack) is attaching at 1 in Dia. 5, but here it doesn't work. Black resists with 2 to 12 and the whole white group is placed in danger. White therefore attaches at 96, his aim being to separate the two black groups and so facilitate a connection at the top. The only problem is that he has to play on a lot of dame points to do so.

Black 105. Victory for Black is now certain. The value of this centre territory is greater than it appears because Black enclosed it naturally, that is, as the byproduct of an attack. Taking territory in the course of an attack is the ideal.

Black 109 aims at 'a', so White 112 is necessary.




Figure 4 (114 - 165)

Figure 4 (114 - 165). What happened to the 'cosmic' style?

If White plays 'a' after Black 65, Black can play 'b', cutting with a ko. Losing that way would be one thing, but Black is so far ahead that he wouldn't even play the ko. To avoid that humiliation, Takemiya resigned. According to Ishida, Kobayashi was 17 or 18 points ahead on the board.

This was a puzzling game for Takemiya fans. What was the founder of the 'cosmic' style doing

with three corners? Why was he playing so much on the second line?

Perhaps he fell into a 'trap' set by Kobayashi. As the latter showed with 9 in Figure 1, his plan was to prevent Takemiya from playing his usual moyo strategy. Whatever the case, this could hardly have been a more convincing win for Kobayashi — he didn't play one bad move. As in last year's Judan title match, he showed that the Takemiya cosmic style held no fears for him.

White resigns after Black 165.

Time taken. White: 7 hours.

Black: 8 hours 21 minutes.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri)

Kobayashi's Summing-up

Igo Club: We didn't see Takemiya play large moyos much in this series.

Kobayashi: Yes, that was surprising. It occurred to me that he may have less confidence than you might expect in his moyo strategy. In this second game as well, Takemiya is the one taking territory. It may have been his strategy to go for profit.

The tsuke-osae joseki [16, 18] he played in the top left is the way you play when you want territory. I thought that White might take four corners.

Igo Club: The attachment at 61 was a tremendous move.

Kobayashi: However well you play, there are about three moves a game that you regret, but in this game there wasn't one. This is very unusual. You're lucky if you play one game a year like that. This was also the game in which I played the move that I remember most vividly from the series — Black 73. Saying this myself may be a little odd, but this is a really good move. It's the move I thought about the hardest in the whole match. I considered the conventional idea of directly attacking the white group above. For example, with Black 73 at 82. I felt drawn to this move, as it solidifies the right side while attacking, but if White links up his top and bottom groups, there's not much suppleness in the position.

Igo Club: Suppleness — that's an interesting way of putting it.


Kobayashi: The idea is to leave as many nuances as possible. Black 73 makes sure that White doesn't link up too easily. It makes it hard

for White to invade at 89 and it induces White 74 etc., solidifying Black's side. Even after the sequence to 84, White's group is not completely secure. Looking at the whole board, I was convinced that 73 was the only move. The stone also felt good the moment I played it — I had a feeling that this way I could win by a little . . .

Igo Club: One professional said that the title match was over after the second game. To change the subject, what is your candid opinion of Takemiya's 'subway' comment?

Kobayashi: 'Subway' go? That's clever. I'll take it as a compliment. I certainly play a territorial game, I might be a member of the 'subway' school, but players like Cho leave me for dead. Look at this game [a Meijin-league game between Cho (white) and Takemiya]. Cho takes profit as fast as he can. He's quite happy to let the opponent build a moyo.

Igo Club: That's a fantastic moyo. Takemiya must have been ecstatic.



Kobayashi: Right. Then when the moyo has expanded to the maximum, he plunges in. His play shows a complete refusal to recognize that a moyo has any value. There's no way I could play like this. Because as far as possible I strive for balance. Compared to Cho, I'm just a novice at taking territory.

Igo Club: In our April issue Cho said the opposite about you. 'Go players all try to make good shape for themselves while denying it to their opponents. That's the norm. But Kobayashi let's the opponent make good shape . . . He's strong!' What's your reaction to this?

Kobayashi: H'm. What can I say?

Game Three

The staff for this game had a special significance. The Yomiuri commentator was Hashimoto Utaro and the referee was Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan. They were the participants in the game known to history as the 'atom bomb game'. The go board used for that game was also used for this game, and the underside of the board bore the signatures of Hashimoto, Iwamoto, and Segoe Kensaku (then 8-dan).

The 'atom bomb game' was the second game of the 3rd Honinbo title, which was played in a private home on the outskirts of Hiroshima City on 4, 5 and 6 August 1945 (the time allowance was 12 hours per player). With the shortage of paper by this stage of the war, newspapers had become greatly reduced in size and the go columns had disappeared. The Mainichi newspaper was unable to pay either the game fees or the expenses for the tournament, but the players themselves (that is, those who for reasons of age or fitness had not been conscripted) were determined to keep go activity going.



Iwamoto Kaoru

The Honinbo was then still the only newspaper tournament. Somehow the elimination rounds, begun in July 1943, were completed (among the players participating were Sakata, Go Seigen, Kitani, Fujisawa Hosai, and Segoe), and Iwamoto Kaoru 7-dan emerged as the challenger. The title match itself took place only because Segoe was able to arrange for the game to be played in the house of a friend, Fujii Junichi, in Hiroshima. The first game was played on 20, 23, 24, and 25 July and was won by Iwamoto.

Before this game began, the players had been warned by the Hiroshima police chief not to play within the city, on the grounds that it would be too dangerous. The day after he delivered this warning, however, the police chief was called to Tokyo on urgent business, so the players were able to play the first game as scheduled. Hashi-



Hashimoto Utaro

moto has written of his memories of the ping of bullets on the roof from the strafing raids carried out by American planes. Despite the unsettling sound effects, the players remained at the go board throughout the game, without resorting to the air-raid shelter. The elderly owner of the house, Fujii, was so moved by the sight of their devotion to go that he exclaimed that he could die happily then and there. Hashimoto comments wryly that being only 38 he couldn't share his feelings.

When he returned and heard that the game had been played after all, the police chief was furious and absolutely forbade them to play any more games in Hiroshima. This was what saved their lives. It was arranged to play the second game in a house close to Segoe's home in Itsukaichi, an outer suburb of Hiroshima.

On the third day, the players saw the Enola Gay fly in. Hashimoto stepped out into the garden and saw the flash of the atomic bomb and the mushroom cloud rising above the city. A great blast of wind broke the windows and made a mess of the room, but since they had started the endgame they tidied up the room and finished the game, which ended in a five-point win for Hashimoto (there was no komi). It was not until the evening, when the streams of survivors pouring out of the city began to reach Itsukaichi, that they began to realize the real magnitude of the disaster and just how lucky they had been.

But for an ornery chief of police, who was himself a strong amateur player, the postwar history of go would have been very different. Iwamoto played a major role in rebuilding the

fortunes of professional go after the war and in internationalizing the game; Hashimoto Uтарo created the Kansai Ki-in and at the age of 80 is still an active player. Their reunion in Hiroshima must have been a moving experience for them.

(The remaining four games of the six-match series were played after the war ended, in November. The result was a 3–3 tie, so a best-of-three playoff, won 2–0 by Iwamoto, was held in the summer of 1946.)

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played on 4, 5 February 1987 in Hiroshima City.

Commentary by Hashimoto Uтарo 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1 – 56)

Figure 1 (1 – 56). *Takemiya's first sanren-sei*


Black 1–5. Finally we see a sanren-sei from Takemiya. Kobayashi counters with star-points himself: he is not going to cede the centre to his opponent.

White 14 is a fighting move; White 34 would be peaceful, but then Black would set up a moyo with Black 15, White 16, Black 22.


Black 17 is correct: Black 'a' would let White escape too easily with 'b'.

Black 19. If at 1 in Dia. 1, White 2 and 4 make a good start towards settling the group.


White 20 is a tesuji. If Black answers with 1 in Dia. 2, White lives with 2 and 4, then aims at attacking with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', not an interesting prospect for Black. The solid




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

connection of 21 is the best answer.

White 22. Delicate timing. White considers the exchange for 23 a gain, so he switches back to the corner.

White 24. Better than White 28, which would allow Black to block at 24,


Black 25. Better for Black than following Dia. 3

Black 29. Black could first have exchanged 1 for White 2 in Dia. 4.

Black 35. The only move a professional, even Takemiya, would consider here. After the joseki is completed, Takemiya makes another low move at 47. He seems to be playing out of character with this submarine attack, but actually he is just following the natural flow of the game. In this position 47 is an interesting move.

Black 49 is the correct follow-up. Black 1 in Dia. 5 would be too lacking in resourcefulness: it just helps White to develop his moyo with 4 and 6.

White 50 is likewise natural. White 51 instead might seem to lead to a similar result to Dia. 5 with Black 50, White 52, Black 'c', but White gets a much weaker shape and his corner has been reduced more. The sequence to 56 is inevitable.



Dia. 5






Figure 2 (57 - 100)



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Figure 2 (57 - 100). The approaching storm

Black 57 is essential. Black could live in the corner as in Dia. 6 but at the cost of giving White too much thickness on the outside. Setting up the squeeze on the outside is much better for Black. Takemiya ends up playing on the outside even after his low initial move at 47.

Black 67. Black 74 would also be a good point, but then White 68, taking territory while attacking, would be big.


White 74 is the key point for both sides.

Black 77. Black 91 would be more severe. A difficult fight would follow when White crosscut at 78, but White would not be able to kill Black. However, Takemiya made the judgement that blocking at 79 was good enough.


Black 85. If at 1 in Dia. 7, White lives with 2 to 6. If Black 'a', then White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.

The focus of the game now becomes the status of White's corner group. Black must not let it live too easily.

White 90 is essential. If White 'a' instead, then Black 90 would be unbearable.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Black 91. Black has his eye on the corner group. If he can build a solid wall on the outside, he can go in and reduce it to one eye.

White 92. The sealed move.

Black 93. The only move. Black 1 in Dia. 8 would be bad. Black reduces part of White's moyo at the top, but the thickness White gains in the centre from the ponnuki would be more than adequate compensation.

White 94. White plays all-out, rejecting the timid move of 'b'. The black stone at 91 seems to have become mochikomi (loss without compensation), but Black is aiming at the white group on the top right.

With 95, a move on which Takemiya spent 64 minutes, the stage is being set for the climactic scene of the game. White continues in the spirit of 94 with 96. The hane at 1 in Dia. 9 looks more conservative, but actually it would be bad.

Dia. 9. Black 2 would be sente against the corner group. If White ensures life with 3, Black attacks at 4. If White 5, Black gets a ladder with 6 to 10.

Takemiya launches a forceful attack with 97 and 99. After the game he commented that he should have played 99 in the centre, but be that as it may, his attack on the side group caused a stir of excitement to run through the players following the game.






Figure 3 (101 - 139)



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Figure 3 (101 - 139). *Takemiya misses his chance.*


Black 3. White can now only get one eye. Black could have cut at 4 instead, but he could not be confident that this would win.

White 4 is natural. White could get a ko with 4 etc. in Dia. 10 (Black does not atari at 5 with 4 as he would next have to defend, letting White make two eyes), but Black has more ko threats.

Takemiya plunged into thought again after White 8. He could play Black 16 next, but White would be bound to break through his encircling net. After 80 minutes of analysis, he extended at 9; his aim was to use White's bad aji in the centre to build a wall there so that he could come back to kill the group on the side.

Black 15 is a double threat. Kobayashi answers the more immediate one by living with 16 - with 15 in place, the side group would have little chance of escaping if Black played at 16. See Dia. 11, where Black 5 is an effective move.

Kobayashi takes care of the immediate problem with 16, whereupon Takemiya launches the attack that he has been preparing in the



Dia. 12

centre. This fight will decide the game.

White 22. Necessary to forestall Black 'a'.

Black 23 makes a semeai (capturing race) in the centre unavoidable, as it is obvious that neither Black nor White can get eyes. Neither side has many liberties, but even so the fight is very difficult. Hashimoto predicted that the game would end early, with one side collapsing, but he refused to take a chance on saying which side it would be. That was just as well - even if he could have read out the fight, he could hardly have foreseen that each side would make a mistake.


Black 25. A clever move: this is the most effective way of hindering the flight of the white group.

White 32. Kobayashi is the first to go wrong. According to Ishida Yoshio, he could have clinched victory by playing at 1 in Dia. 12.

Dia. 12. Black must answer 1 with 2 to 8. White next increases his liberties with 9, then after 13 he is one move ahead in the semeai. Note that if Black plays 12 at 'a', White has a clever counter with 'b', Black 'c', White 12, which increases his liberties.

Because of White's mistake, Black now gets a chance, but with 39 it's his turn to go wrong. He misses the chance to set up a ko which would probably win the game. The correct move, again discovered by Ishida, is pressing at 'b'. Ishida offered Dia. 13 (next page) in support of his comment.

Dia. 13. If Black plays 1, White has only six liberties, so he has to start filling in Black's




Dia. 13 22: ko

liberties with 2 to 8. At this stage Black plays the clever move of 9. If White plays 10 at 17, Black gets an extra liberty by cutting at 'a', so he wins the fight. That means that White has to play 10, but Black fills in the outside liberties, then captures at 17. The ko with 18 to 22 cannot be avoided. When Black makes a ko threat at 23, White has to ignore it, so Black captures three stones. Ishida played out the remaining endgame and concluded that Black would have won by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points. Takemiya is a close friend of Ishida's and at a public commentary he gave on the game he repeatedly shook his head in wonder, lamenting, 'Why couldn't he see this?' He surmised that Takemiya failed to discover Black 9 in the diagram.

Figure 4 (140 – 156). *No luck for Takemiya*

White 40 averts the crisis. Seeing that Black



Dia. 14




Figure 4 (140 – 156)

gets no chance to win after this, 39 was the losing move.

Black 43. Black 1 in Dia. 14 doesn't work. White increases his liberties, then strikes at 20 to win the semeai.

White 46 secures the win. Perhaps Takemiya overlooked this move; at any rate, he spent 88 minutes on his next move, but by now it was too late to pull off anything.

This game, with its large-scale centre struggle, was a bit more like the Cho–Takemiya encounters of a couple of years back, but the fight took place inside Kobayashi's moyo. Takemiya was given his best chance of the series to pick up a win, but he didn't take his reading far enough. The tesuji of 9 in Dia. 13 is not so hard to find if you look for it. For want of trying, he had handed Kobayashi an almost insurmountable start.

All the same, this was the most lively and dramatic game of the series so far, and the spirited nature of Takemiya's play gave his fans some grounds for hope that he might yet stage a recovery.

Black resigns after White 156.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 15 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 57 minutes.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri)

Kobayashi's Summing-up

Igo Club: You're famous for your enthusiasm for study. I suppose you researched Takemiya's game pretty thoroughly.

Kobayashi: More or less. But cramming for one night doesn't get you anywhere. What is important, above all, is regular study. This is something I always say: you can't expect to play in a game at a higher level than your usual study.

Igo Club: This game saw Takemiya's only sanren-sei. I got the feeling that 14 was a counter you'd worked out.

Kobayashi: That's not so. I hadn't done any research on this move; it just occurred to me at the time. It worked quite well. Since Black set out to capture it on a small scale with 15 and 17, the point was to go for a swap (furikawari) by switching to the corner with 18 and 20. If Black had attacked on a large scale with 17 to the left of 9 or above 23, I would probably have moved out with a one-space jump. . . .

Igo Club: Well, this made three wins in a row. Did you feel that the title was yours?

Kobayashi: No, no. I didn't count my chickens. Still, if you exclude TV fast games, at this point I had won eight games in a row against Takemiya. Optimist though he is, the damage seemed to be starting to tell. He wasn't his usual lively self in the discussion after the game.

Game Four

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 18, 19 February 1987 in Saga City.

Commentary by Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan.

Takemiya is renowned for his optimistic nature and by the time of this game he had regained his usual cheerfulness. He betrayed no signs that he was feeling the pressure, even though he was faced with a shutout. At the party on the eve of the game, he said in his address: 'It's time to put emotion aside and show the fans my real go. There is no need for the fans in Nagano to worry.' This was a reference to the scheduled site of the fifth game; hosting a title game is a big event for a local go organization, and Takemiya was guaranteeing the Nagano organizers that a fifth game would indeed take place.

Figure 1 (1 – 30). An unusual forcing move

When Takemiya sat down at the go board, however, things were different. An indication of just how seriously he was taking this game is given by the fact that he spent 25 minutes on 4.





Figure 1 (1 – 30)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Takemiya: 'If I play 4, it's obvious that Black will play the Kobayashi pattern of 5 and 7. I considered doing something different but I ended up playing niren-sei. I just wasted time.'

White 8 is the third approach move we have seen tried against the Kobayashi pattern in this series.

Black 15. Black 1 in Dia. 1 may be good shape, but it helps White to make good shape in turn with 2 to 6. Later, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' will be big.

Black 17 is the latest innovation in this pattern. Previously Black 'a' and Black 18 were often played.

Black 21. Black 1 in Dia. 2 would just help White to build outside thickness.

Black 27. Invading at 'b' would be worth close on 30 points, but after White 'c' through Black 'h', White would extend to 'i', which is just as big.

White 28 is startling: it is not like Takemiya to play such a crude forcing move. It certainly helps to contain Black on the side, but it has a large element of aji-keshi (erasing potential)

about it. Most players would just cap at 30 or at 'j' or make the 38–40 exchange immediately.






Figure 2 (31 - 64)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4 12: ko


Figure 2 (31 - 64). Competition to take the initiative

Black 31 and 33 make good shape and nullify White's influence to the left, so the position is already a little unsatisfactory for White.

White 34 forestalls Black 'a'. Note that 34 is possible instead of the more conservative move of 'b' because the six white stones below are quite strong, appearances notwithstanding (if they appear strong to you, you are quite a strong player).

White 38, 40. This is a good combination, securing the corner while weakening the black group.

White 44 is a preliminary to the invasion. If



Dia. 5

Black plays 47 at 1 in Dia. 3, White gets a good result to 12.

White 48 is correct. If White plays at 'c', Black will switch to 'd', giving White an inadequate result. White considers 46 as a forcing move; even if Black later plays 'c', it still has some aji.

Black 49. If Black goes for territory with 'e', he cannot be confident of winning – White has 50 points on the top and bottom left. Black therefore tries to take control of the game in the centre.

White 50. This time Takemiya's 3–3 invasion becomes the focus of the game. Kobayashi's 53 is a slip, according to Yamabe. After 56 Black can get a ko with Black 'f'–White 'g', but he suffers considerable damage if he loses the ko, so choosing the right time to start it is far from easy. If, however, Black plays 53 at 1 in Dia. 4, he gets a much better ko, since he suffers very little damage if he loses it.

Black 57. At the moment White has more ko threats, so Black can't start the ko, but he has it constantly in mind during the subsequent play.

White 58. Takemiya is prepared to sacrifice the stone to the right (34) on a small scale. With 59 Kobayashi turns down the invitation.

White 60. Takemiya spent 95 minutes on this move, evidence that he regarded this as a decisive point of the game. He must have considered attacking the black group on the left but presumably didn't like his prospects. Abe 9-dan, in a commentary in *Kido*, surmised that he

probably considered 1 to 5 in Dia. 5. The problem with this result is that the 'captured' black group still has too much aji.

White 64. The sealed move.




Figure 3 (65 - 112)

Figure 3 (65 - 112). *White parries the attack.*

Black 69 is severe, but Black cannot kill the group. If White were afraid of this attack, he could have played 68 at 70 or 71.


Black 79 cuts the group off, but White has a clever counter prepared with 80 and 82, which set up the atari at 90.

Black 83. If at 'a', White links up with 'b'.

Black 87. The order of moves here is important. If Black carelessly answers at 1 in Dia. 6, White has to capture something after 2.


White 92. The group is now safe. This result may look like a failure for Black, if you assume that he was trying to kill the group, but he has gained from attacking it. Specifically, Black 67 makes 93 a good move; he also profits from the thickness created by 91. At this stage Abe thought that Black might be a shade ahead, Ishida that White might be leading.

White 94. The slowest move of the game — Takemiya spent 104 minutes on it. He must have believed that it put him in the lead. If instead White pushes up at 1 in Dia. 7, Black captures him with 2 to 8. However, the aji of 1 means that a white move at 'a' would be sente, so White's centre group would be safe. Also, White would have quite a few ko threats here, so his top right group would win a ko. Therefore —



Dia. 6

Dia. 7



Dia. 8


Dia. 8. Black would switch to 2 here. White could now capture Black with 3 to 9, but at the cost of giving him a ponnuki at 6 and 8. This ponnuki would almost certainly spell death for the centre white group. Also, the aji of the three captured black stones would reverse the balance of ko threats.

White 96. Kobayashi expected this move and had resolved to cut it off by brute force with 97 and 99. The question of whether he gains from capturing 96 is hard to answer, however, for it retains a lot of troublesome aji.

White 102 is well timed. Black would like to counter by cutting at 108, that is, at 1 in Dia. 9, but then White uses the above-mentioned aji of his captured stone to build a wall with 2 to 6. After 8 to 14, the black group will find it difficult to live.

Black 109. Black doesn't want to atari here, but he can't let White play at 109.

White 110, 112. White is still getting use out of his captured stone.



Dia. 9





Figure 4 (113 - 160)
Ko: 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47



Dia. 10

Figure 4 (113 - 160). Kobayashi mishandles the ko fight.

White 14. Black now has to worry about the eye shape of this group, which makes it all the harder for him to start the ko on the top right.

White 18 is a good, thick move. If White used this move to secure life for the top right group, Black 'a' would be severe.

Black 21. Black starts the ko knowing full well that he doesn't have enough ko threats to win it. From the outset he plans to give way with 45.

Black 47 is thoughtless, perhaps the losing move. Kobayashi must have facilely assumed that White had to answer at 49 or perhaps he hallucinated that the Black 48-White 53 exchange had already been played (pros are known to make this kind of blunder, that is, starting with the third move of a sequence they have spent a lot of time reading out). With 47 Black must block at 1 in Dia. 10. If White 2 and 4, Black might win by $1\frac{1}{2}$ or $2\frac{1}{2}$ points. However, if White chooses to keep on fighting the ko instead of connecting at 4, there is no saying who would win.

White takes the lead with 48 and 50. The result to 58 is worse for Black than Dia. 10.




Figure 5 (161 - 200)
Ko: 79, 82, 85, 88; 93: ko (below 90); 100: ko (at 90)

Figure 5 (161 - 200). The gap widens.

Black 69 is a mistake. If White answers at 'a', 69 becomes a good forcing move, but White answers at 70, a move he wanted to play even without the spur of 69. Black cannot win the ko that follows here, so he should have played 69 at 70; even then he would have been a little behind, but 69 makes the game irretrievably lost.

Black 89 and 91 do not make up for the loss on the right side.

Figure 6 (201 - 266). At last a win for Takemiya

White 2 is big: it sets up the endgame moves of 8, 14, and 16.

Black 17. If omitted, White throws in here and wins the semeai.

This game ended at 9.44 p.m., the latest of the series. The players discussed the game for a bare ten minutes before everyone went off to the little party always held by the sponsors after a game finishes. However, Kobayashi remained at the board and with Aizawa Kaoru 2-dan, the game recorder, he went over the middle game for an hour or so, trying to pinpoint the reason for his defeat. The conclusion he arrived at was that he would have won if he had played 147 at




Figure 6 (201 – 266)

65: connects (above 29); 66: connects (above 12). White wins and connects the ko.

148, as indicated in Dia. 10. According to Yamabe, however, if White persists with the ko, this will not necessarily be a win for Black.

White wins by 3½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 57 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 31 minutes.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri newspaper, with reference to a commentary in the April 1987 'Kido'.)

Kobayashi's Summing-up

Igo Club: Takemiya got you again at the party on the eve of the game. 'When I see that face like a potato, things go wrong for me.'

Kobayashi: A potato, eh? Is that how I look?

Igo Club: With his 'subways' and 'potatoes', Takemiya has the talent to be a copywriter.

Kobayashi: I think that the fuseki of this game was also satisfactory for me.

Igo Club: White 28 and 30 are unusual. Are they new moves?

Kobayashi: I wonder. It was the first time I've had them played against me. With their follow-up at 38 and 40, these moves show that White wants territory. I felt grateful for them.

Igo Club: The cosmic style has turned into the subway style. Takemiya is taking territory and Kobayashi is playing on top.

Kobayashi: Later on White took territory on the top left and bottom left, then adopted a shinogi strategy [staking the game on the survival of a weak group], leaving the ko in the top right.

This was quite different from the usual Takemiya. ...

Igo Club: You were a little ahead going into the endgame, but you made a funny blunder.

Kobayashi: I did something meaningless, trying to gain a ko threat [147]. All I had to do was just play normal moves. Immediately after the game finished, I was very upset, thinking that I'd dropped a good game, but looking back on it I realized that I couldn't really say I'd thrown away a win. It was extremely close and either side could easily have won. Looking at it this way helped me to calm down.

Game Five

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played on 25, 26 February 1987 in Nagano City.

Commentary by Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1 – 30)

Figure 1 (1 – 30). A difference of opinion

Black 5. Again Takemiya passes up on his trademark sanren-sei.

Black 23 is an ambitious, Takemiya-like move. Black hopes for 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 (next page); he would then get ideal shape at the bottom with 4. Kobayashi thwarts this plan with the severe invasion at 24.

The players disagreed on the 25–26 exchange. Takemiya: 'I was happy when White entered at 26. This is good for Black, isn't it?' Kobayashi: 'Black 25 surprised me. If White is going to play in this area, then playing 24 first is better than



Dia. 1

invading immediately at 26. Both sides are satisfied — Takemiya and I always seem to disagree.’

When White plays 24 first, the result is different from the single-handed 3–3 invasion. This way White gets to descend at 30, which offers some assistance to the two white stones above.






Figure 2 (31 – 60)

Figure 2 (31 – 60). *Takemiya’s centre judgement is questioned.*

Black 31. The Yomiuri commentary quoted a comment by Go Seigen on this move. ‘In this position it’s better not to let the white groups on the side and the bottom right link up. Consequently, if I were playing I would follow Dia. 2 with 31. Black can then play first at the bottom



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


with 11. If later White ‘a’, the idea is to parry with ‘b.’ Takemiya is, of course, following a completely different strategy: Black 31 emphasizes the centre and sets up the pressing move at 47. He will be happy to see White link up along the side.

White 32. Once again Kobayashi picks exactly the right time to invade the moyo. The continuation to 44 is the same as in the final game of last year’s Tengen title match (see GW48).


Black 37. Black would like to block White’s escape route with 1 in Dia. 3, but it doesn’t work. After 2 to 6, Black ‘a’ lets White secure himself easily with ‘b’; cutting at ‘c’ instead runs into a counterattack in White ‘d’, Black ‘a’, White ‘e’.

Black 47. Takemiya carries out his plan of building centre thickness, but Go Seigen still advocated separating White. ‘Letting White link up with 50 is a pity. I would prefer to attack with 47 at ‘a’; if then White ‘b’, Black ‘c’ would work well.’

Black 51 is a clever forcing move. White 52 is forced. If instead White plays 1 in Dia. 4, Black 2 is the obvious counter. The result to 8 looks



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

good for Black, as he breaks into the corner, but actually White will be satisfied when he hanes at 9. Rather than 2 —

Dia. 5. Black would play 2 here, which secures the ponnuki without weakening the centre. The continuation to 18 was worked out by Kataoka 8-dan. Next, 'a' would be the limit White could go into the moyo; Black would answer at 'b', giving a difficult game.

White prefers to answer patiently with 52 and 54.

Black 55. Perhaps the decisive move of the game, which means the losing move for Takemiya. One would hardly expect him to make a mistake in setting up a moyo, but everyone — Yamashiro, Yamabe (the referee), Abe — looked askance at this move and Takemiya himself acknowledged after the game that it was too narrow. The right move here is 56 or 57.

Black 55 is demonstrably bad because White takes the lead by playing the straightforward reducing sequence of 56 to 60. If, for example, Black had played 55, at 57 and White had reduced in similar fashion with a shoulder hit at 58, Black's moyo would be one line wider, making an immediate difference of five points. Of course, White would play differently if Black played 57, but the point is that 57 would have made a game of it. Takemiya is supposed to be unequalled in his understanding of centre moyos; his making an uncharacteristic slip like this is proof that he was not his usual self in this series.

Figure 3 (61 — 100). *The game is over?*

White 68. When Kajiwara saw this move, he




Figure 3 (61 — 100)

declared that the game was over. The question is whether Black should have blocked at 'a' with 67; that would permit White 67, forcing the black group to run out into the centre, but this might have been better for Black. Apparently with 55 and 67 Takemiya was over-optimistic in his assessment of the position.

Black 73 was the sealed move. Perhaps by now Takemiya had realized that the game was not looking good for him — he spent two hours 38 minutes on 73. On the first day Takemiya had already used most of his time — 6 hours 40 minutes to Kobayashi's two hours 34 minutes.

White 74. The simplest answer to 73. White 78, forestalling Black 'b', again keeps the game simple. Interviewed immediately after the game, Kobayashi commented: 'I thought that White was a little ahead, but it was very close. One false step would immediately ruin everything, so I was extra careful. When I invaded at 90, it looked as if I'd be able to pull off a win; then — this is the first time it's happened to me — I began to tremble. I had to work hard to control myself.' One may wonder that a player of Kobayashi's experience should become so excited over defending a title, but although he has now been at the top a couple of years he was on the verge of defending a top title (that is, a best-of-seven) for the first time; that he was defeating his leading critic among fellow professionals might have added some spice to the triumph.

White 86. White gains from the exchange for 87: he stops Black from playing 86 in sente.





Figure 4 (101 - 150)

Figure 4 (101 - 150). *Kobayashi's impeccable endgame*

From this point on Kobayashi displays his renowned mastery of endgame. He doesn't give Takemiya a chance.

Black 37 should be at 1 in Dia. 6. White captures at 2, but Black gains one or two points on the figure.

White 48 clinches the game.



Dia. 6

Dia. 7

Figure 5 (151 - 200). *Kobayashi winds the game up.*

Black 51 is forced: he would like to counter with 1 in Dia. 7, but White sacrifices another stone to set up squeezes on both sides. This would be much worse for Black than the result in the figure. Black would not gain by playing 1 at 5 - White still plays 8 and 10.

Black 73. Takemiya went into byo-yomi.

Figure 6 (201 - 235). *Kobayashi's first defence*

The game finished at 5.13 p.m. and Kobayashi broke into his famous grin. Takemiya showed




Figure 5 (151 - 200)

80: at 55




Figure 6 (201 - 235)

Ko (over 20): 23, 26, 29; 31: connects (at 20); 34: connects (at 13). Black wins and connects the ko.

that he could be a good loser and was quite cheerful in the post-game discussion and at the party afterwards.

Kobayashi had two good reasons to be happy: he had defended the top title in Japan and he had done it just in time to enable him to concentrate on the upcoming Judan title match (though as it turned out that didn't help him). Even so, he remained as he has been for half a year Japan's busiest player, as a look at his schedule following this game will show. The Kisei title match ended



Kobayashi completes his first defence of the Kisei title. Despite his brave words, Takemiya was unable to dethrone him. Most players do better the second time they make a challenge for a top title, but with Takemiya it was the other way around. He may have to show Kobayashi a little more respect now.

on the 26th; on the 28th he played the final of the TV Haya-go championship, in which he defeated Cho; on the 29th he had another TV game; on 2 March he played a Meijin league game (he lost to Shuko); then on the 5th he played the first game of the Judan title match (he lost to Kato). This was a grueling schedule, but constant playing is what keeps Kobayashi in form. He probably much prefers it to the long period of inactivity that left him so ill prepared for last year's Meijin title match.

Later on that evening Takemiya let his chagrin show. 'I've realized only too well what a fool I am. I promised myself that I wouldn't let that kind of go rule the roost, but since I've lost I can only blame myself. I vow that before improving my game I'll improve myself and make a fresh start.' As these words show, Takemiya was perhaps a little too conscious of his opponent; if he treated Kobayashi as just another player and concentrated on his game he might do better.

White wins by 3½ points.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 11 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 56 minutes.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri newspaper, with reference to a commentary in the April 1987 'Kido'.)

Kobayashi's Summing-up

Igo Club: Takemiya set up a moyo from the bottom into the centre — he finally played his usual game.

Kobayashi: That's not quite true. Even in this game I felt that Black was going for territory. The joseki in the top left corner discards thickness in favour of taking territory. In spite of which, Black sets out to enclose a moyo — that's contradictory.

Igo Club: I see. To put it another way, you outplayed him by inducing him to enclose his moyo . . . Black 55 had a really bad reputation in Tokyo: it's too close to Black's own thickness. He should extend further.

Kobayashi: That's right. Takemiya keenly regretted this move. Because the shoulder hit of 56 worked perfectly. However, Black 55 was criticized because it looked as if White won easily; if Black had won . . .

Igo Club: It's retrospective wisdom. What if White had extended further, with 55 at 57?

Kobayashi: It's difficult. If Black had played there, I intended to take my time and think it out. For example, what about making as if to enclose the left side with a move at 70? White threatens to jump in next [one space below 55],

so Black also has his problems. You can't just say that Black would have done better if he had extended further.

At this point, I played the forcing moves of 64 and 66. This was superb timing. No one has said it for me, so I have to say it myself.

Igo Club: Really? White 64 and 66? Even an amateur could play forcing moves like these. Of course, the content might be different.

Kobayashi: If you think of the position if Black were later to invade the left side, you want to have these forcing moves already on the board. This is the only time they will be sente.

Igo Club: What if Black were to use 67 to block at 'a' in Figure 3?

Kobayashi: I considered this. I would turn at 71, then after Black jumped sideways (one space above 89), I would crawl at 67 and put it to the corner group. I had confidence in this strategy.

Igo Club: You've won your two title matches with Takemiya. Could one take it that you've settled accounts with him on the go board?

Kobayashi: Nonsense! Things went well this time, but I'll be running into Takemiya again. Settling accounts is not so easy.


(Games 2 to 5 translated by John Power.)

36 Tesuji Patterns

Sakata Eio


In this issue we are starting two new series, one dealing with basic tesujis, the other with important life and death patterns. The problems are fairly simple, so they should be of interest

and profit to players just starting to work their way up the kyu ladder. At the same time, we hope that they will provide stronger players with some useful revision.




1. Black to Play

This is a famous problem, but it may not be so easy for someone seeing it for the first time. How does Black capture three white stones?



2. Black to play

This is another famous problem, but it is a little more advanced. The technique involved is very useful in actual play. How does Black win the corner fight?




3. Black to play

This is a famous 'shape' problem. How can Black save his corner stones?

Answers on page 39.


36 Life and Death Patterns

Kato Masao



1. Black to play


What is the vital point for making two eyes for this group?



2. White to play

What is the vital point for getting a second eye? A ko is not good enough.

Answers on page 40.



3. Black to play

Black has a potential eye in the corner and on the side, but he has to make one in sente to get time to play the other.

The World of Go

Nakayama Noriyuki

Chapter Five: A White Paper on the Lives of Professionals (ii)

(This is the concluding section of Chapter Five of Nakayama 5-dan's best-selling all-round introduction to go.)

Professionals and the mass media

The majority of professionals learn go before they are ten and within two or three years they reach the level of amateur 5-dan. The people around such a player, impressed by the emergence of this genius, arrange for him to become a professional; he starts by becoming an insei, that is, an apprentice professional, at the Nihon Ki-in. Budding masters from all over the country develop by competing with each other, and those who have hatched into chicks by the age of 19 become professional 1-dans. Those who fail have to switch to another avenue of life.

For these aspiring professionals, the inseis, coming out on top in the fierce competition to reach shodan is the only thing in life that matters, so naturally the last thing they think about is their schoolwork. Of course, many of them get very good results at school, but no one will criticize them even if their results are bad — provided that their go results are good. If both are bad, then their case is hopeless.

In this way a new shodan is born and the people around him call him 'sensei' (teacher). Even if he is only twelve or thirteen, he is a fullfledged professional and, if he felt like it, he could visit pupils to give lessons and make about twice the income of an office worker. However, for these young professionals, study comes first — this is the crucial period of their lives in which they have to build up their strength if they hope to be Meijin one day. In this respect, they have something in common with the world of the scholar.

The youngest professional shodan in go was the go saint 'Shusaku Sensei' from the end of the Edo period (1600 — 1868), who made his debut at the age of ten. The second youngest was 11. The record for the youngest 'sensei' might actually be held by Ogawa Doteki Sensei, who is supposed to have already been 6-dan at the age

of 12, but there are no records remaining from this period (the end of the 17th century) to tell us exactly when he became shodan.

With things the way they are, it's unavoidable that most professional players have a narrow outlook on life. They spend their time studying how to win against the other 300 professionals in the Nihon Ki-in, but since they do not play against professionals with a big difference in rank, at the most their actual opponents probably number no more than 100. In the case of the writer, Nakayama 5-dan, I am exempted from playing in the 1st preliminary round of a tournament, so I don't get the opportunity to play the young players who have recently become professionals. On the other hand, winning my way through to an encounter with champions like Cho, Kobayashi or Takemiya would be like winning a lottery for me — I'll be lucky if it happens once in my lifetime.

When you look at it like this, you realize that the sphere of activity of us professionals is very limited — it's like water swirling around in a cup. Even so, there was just one occasion when the 300 drops of water became agitated and boiled over, causing a stir in the world at large. This was the affair known as the 'Meijin tournament dispute', in which sponsorship of the Meijin title was transferred from the Yomiuri newspaper to the Asahi.

In the first instalment of this chapter, I gave a list of the fees and prize monies for each tournament and indicated that I thought they were a little too low. However, these amounts actually represent a great increase on what they were. Some ten years or so ago, the fees were really miserable. The lack of knowledge of the world on the part of professionals and the diplomatic ineptness of the Ki-in administrators were partly to blame, but there was also the fact that the crafty mass media acted in concert to keep the contract fees as low as possible.

When the Meijin tournament began in 1961, the sponsorship fee paid by the Yomiuri news-

paper was ¥25,000,000. At this time the subscription fee for a newspaper was ¥390, so as the fee for the top go title this was not an amount that we had to be ashamed of. The Meijin title could look down on the titles sponsored by the other newspapers and swagger about with its head held high.

However, the astonishing thing was that ten years later, in 1971, the sponsorship fee was still ¥25,000,000. In 1972, the 11th year of the title, there was a minuscule rise of 10%, taking the fee to ¥27,500,000, but this decade had been a period of high growth for the Japanese economy, and both the starting salary for university graduates and the monthly newspaper subscription fee had jumped to several times what they were in 1961.

Then in 1973 and 1974 there was once again no rise in the sponsorship fee. Despite their ignorance of the world, the Nihon Ki-in had not just been sitting idly by. In the contract for the 1st Meijin title there was the clause:

The contract can be renewed each year in accordance with fluctuations in prices. The wage index published by the Ministry of Labour will be taken as the criterion for measuring these fluctuations.

In the contract for the 6th title we find:

When the Nihon Ki-in makes a request (for a rise in the sponsorship fee) in accordance with the rise in prices etc., the Yomiuri Newspaper Company will comply.

The desire for such a rise was a real one.

When the Meijin tournament reached its 9th term, the suggestion was made that an additional sponsor be obtained. Masubuchi Tatsuko 6-dan, the doyenne of women professionals, in company with her disciple Sakata Eio 9-dan, the Nihon Ki-in Public Relations director Tanimiya Teiji 6-dan, and the Yomiuri go reporter Yamada Fukumenshi, paid a call on the Toyota Motor Corporation. There was a personal connection because the wife of the president of Toyota was a pupil of Masubuchi's and everyone was relieved when the president readily agreed. During the next three years the Yomiuri earned an advertising income of over ¥90,000,000 from

Toyota.

At this time, Tanimiya requested a small rise in the sponsorship fees, consisting of a lump sum of ¥10,000,000 and a rise in the contract fee of ¥7,500,000. The reasons are unknown to us, but this request was not even taken seriously.

To me it seems quite unbelievable that such a thing could really happen, but if this account is accurate, how are we to judge the true face of the mass media?

It was probably about this time that the feeling began to pervade the Nihon Ki-in that 'the Yomiuri is hopeless'. If even top professionals were doing so badly, what about the second-rank players? You couldn't make a proper living even if you became the number one player and amassed all the titles, so it is not to be wondered at that the number of inseis, on whom the future of go rested, had declined to 19 from a peak of nearly 100 and that there were not enough of them to go round as game recorders. What was going to happen to the go world? Go players became filled with a profound sense of crisis.

In December 1974 it was suddenly announced that the Meijin tournament was going to be transferred from the Yomiuri to the Asahi. The news took everyone by surprise; we rank-and-file professionals had no prior knowledge, but what with the background circumstances described above, an absolute majority of professionals approved of the surprise move (at this time there were only two professionals who expressed opposition).

There are many things that I want to say to the mass media (not just the Yomiuri) in connection with this affair. For over a year we professionals were roundly criticized in the pages of most newspapers and inwardly we were seething; on behalf of my fellow players I have long intended to describe the affair in detail one day, but now that I have been given the opportunity, for some reason I no longer feel any enthusiasm for the task.

This affair did after all take place ten years ago. Properly speaking, the go world and the mass media are in a position in which they must cooperate in promoting Japanese culture; it is an old wound that we can't forget, but for that very reason I think that we must forget it.

When all is said and done, this affair took

place because go players were too ignorant of the real nature of the mass media and the mass media in turn were too indifferent to our feelings. The go reporters from the various newspapers with whom we associate today are all amiable, sensible people and I can only wonder with amazement why we argued so vehemently in those days. There is just one thing I would like to say, however, and that is that I still don't understand the attitude of the people who hold the ultimate responsibility in the newspaper companies.

The manager of one big newspaper company said: 'There's no shogi column in the London Times.' That may be true, but even so the need for go and shogi columns — the games are a part of Japanese culture, after all — in Japanese newspapers hardly needs to be stated.

At any rate, 1976 was a memorable year: it was the year when it became possible for a number of players to earn their living from tournaments alone (it saw the start of the Kisei tournament and the new Meijin tournament). As one of the humbler members of the professional ranks, I would like to express my profound gratitude to all those who in the end responded with a good grace to the desire of the go world for improved treatment.

Seeking a dream on the go board.

I think that I've made it clear that a professional go player's life is by no means an easy one, but from a different perspective you might be able to say that it's not a tough profession either. Almost all professionals learn go about the time they enter elementary school and thereafter virtually devote themselves to the game, so it's very difficult for them to switch to a different profession. Even so, if the life of a professional were really arduous, you would in theory expect to find some players giving up go. In fact, this virtually never happens.

There are various reasons, but I think that the main one is the carefree status enjoyed by a professional go player: each player is lord of his own domain, small though it may be; there is no boss to give him orders and no subordinates to be looked after. Of course, Sakata Sensei is our greatly respected senior and Cho Chikun is like royalty, but in theory they are simply fellow practitioners of the art of go; if we don't feel like it, we don't have to show them any special respect. We don't have to go to a company and curry favour with the department chief, we can live our lives the way we want to, and this is something we wouldn't exchange for anything.



Banker turned professional go player: Ishikura Noboru

Another important point is that our time is our own. Twice a month we have to show up at the Nihon Ki-in by 10 a.m. to play a game, but what we do with the rest of our time is our business. Players like Cho and Kobayashi have for 20 years devoted all their free time to study and have risen to the peak of the go world, but for this humble professional, who ranks 200th, things have not gone that well and he finds himself snowed under with teaching work.

Even so, the manly thing about this profession is that one shoulders the responsibility for everything oneself, and this is what attracts me to the world of go. In boxing you have to worry about biased judging and in the Japan Series in baseball you may be convinced that what the umpire called a ball was a strike right down the centre, but there's nothing like this in go; if you lose, it's because you were the weaker player; the other person won because he studies harder. If you win a game you get to play another one, and in turn you learn from that and get stronger. You can dream of the day when fortune favours you in the next contest because you've got stronger.

There is a professional at the Nihon Ki-in named Ishikura Noboru. He graduated from Azabu High School, and entered Tokyo University, then got an elite job with the Japan Industrial Bank. He can't be too much of a fool. Of course, there are probably some senior go players who will say that he's still only 5-dan because he wasted so much time going to Tokyo University . . .

Be that as it may, why did Ishikura plunge into the insecurity of a go career after graduating from the Law College of Tokyo University and getting such a good job? If he had stuck with the bank job, he would in the course of time have inevitably found himself promoted to branch manager. Rising to a directorship was not out of the question.

I sometimes have the chance to chat with Ishikura and as far as I can surmise, his outlook is more or less as follows.

Working in a bank is certainly a solid profession. You secure a respected social position and you can live a secure, peaceful life. However, it is a life without dreams. After a number of years you get married, you rise to the position

of section chief, then department chief, then assistant manager, then if you are lucky you become a branch manager before you retire. You can calculate exactly what you'll get as your retirement allowance.

In this respect, the life of a professional is full of ups and downs. One day you're elated over a win, the next cast down because of a loss. The thrills of such a life will be readily understood by anyone who has played go; for someone who has made go his profession they are irresistible.

Actually Ishikura was a Nihon Ki-in insei when he was a child. It was in the period when the go world had gone into the slump described earlier and you couldn't expect to make a good living even if you won a title. So he gave up go, went to Tokyo University, experienced employment in a top-flight company — and found it tedious! He remembered with nostalgia the go ambitions of his childhood. Right, let's seek my dream on the go board once again. At least, this is how the writer pictures it.

The square board represents freedom. It represents dreams unlimited. I hope that Ishikura makes a success of go and wins a title. He's no fool. I am sure that he will do well.

Perhaps because I have written several tens of books, I am often requested to write my autograph with some kind of message on coloured paper. If ten sheets of paper are produced, I try to write something different on each sheet. This is because of professional pride as a writer, but owing to my paucity of brain cells there are times when I have trouble thinking of something to write. At such times, though I am ashamed to admit it, I make it a practice to write the following:

*Life is full of dreams
So too the go board . . .*

All go players, great and small, spend a lifetime of wandering, seeking their dreams on the square board. For my part, I think that this is a life with its own rewards.


(From 'Igo no Sekai', published by Iwanami Shoten.
Translated by John Power.)

36 Tesuji Patterns: Answers

Continued from page 34

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1, a wedge (warikomi), is the answer. This is one of the basic sacrifice techniques. It is generally known as the 'crane's nest' tesuji — the four white stones are likened to a crane in a nest of black stones.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If White tries to escape with 2 (or 4), the follow-up at 3 is important. After White captures at 4 —

Dia. 3. Black ataris at 5 and captures. This technique, in which the opponent is still in atari even after connecting, is known as *oiotoshi* (literally 'pursuing and felling').



Dia. 3


Dia. 4

Dia. 4. If it is White's turn to move, he must defend with 1 or 'a' or 'b'.

Answer to Problem 2


Dia. 1. Black 1 is the answer. This move is known as 'the weasel's belly contact play', though the similarity in shape to a weasel must be left to the reader's imagination. Black's stones don't seem to be closely related, but as soon as White tries to do something he finds that they are working together.

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black 3 is a good follow-up. White must extend at 4, but now Black can



Dia. 1

Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 4


capture a stone with 5 and save the corner.

Dia. 3. If Black simply extends at 1, then White gets the chance to play the 'weasel's belly' tesuji with 2. Next —

Dia. 4. Black will probably continue with 3 and 5. The result to 11 is not too bad, as Black builds outside thickness, but White gets a lot of profit. Dia. 2 is better.

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the answer. This tesuji also has a fanciful name: 'the goblin's nose contact play' (Japanese goblins are known for their long noses).




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black 1 is the vital point of the capturing race. Black of course loses the fight, but by reducing White's liberties he prevents him from trying to capture Black's corner stones. Up to 5 he links up his groups.

Dia. 3. Resisting with 2 and 4 is bad for White. He cannot prevent Black from linking up and he ends up with four stones in atari instead of the two in Dia. 2. Note that if White plays 2 at 'a', Black ataris at 2 and captures White.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Black 1 is wrong, as it lets White take the vital point of 2. Black can live in the corner, but his three stones to the left are looking miserable.

(*'Let's Go'*, January 1983)


36 Life and Death Patterns: Answers

Continued from page 34


Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 looks simple once you see it, but it is not so easy to find. It is the only move that guarantees an eye on both sides. If White 'a', Black 'b'.


Dia. 2. Black 1 fails because of the placement at 4.




Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: wrong



Dia. 3: wrong



Dia. 4: wrong

Dia. 3. Black 1 lets White seize the vital point with 4.


Dia. 4. Black 1 lets White destroy the second eye with 2. The point of 1 in Dia. 1 is that it forestalls White's contact play at 2 here.

Answer to Problem 2


Dia. 1. The diagonal move (kosumi) at 1 is the only move. This can be a blindspot, as it seems to make a false eye, but the point is that Black can't enter at 'a'.

Dia. 2. White 1 also looks good: Black seems to be forced to connect at 2, so White makes his second eye with 3. But —


Dia. 3. Black can counter with 2, playing a ko when White tries to capture with 3. This makes it clear that 2 is the vital point.




Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: naive



Dia. 3: ko




Dia. 4: ko

Dia. 4. If White cuts at 1, expecting Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 2, he will be disappointed. Black has the clever counter of 2; if next White 'b', he plays a ko with Black 'c'.


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the only move: Black 'a' is no good. If White plays 2 to stop Black from getting two eyes there, Black secures his second eye with 3. Note that playing 3 at 'b' would let White destroy the eye with White 'c', followed by White 3. Next —


Dia. 2. If White 4, Black 5 secures an eye here (through the oi-otoshi technique). If then White 6, Black secures his eye on the side with 7 to 11. If White 6 at 7, Black just plays at 6.




Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: alive



Dia. 3: dead



Dia. 4: alive

Dia. 3. The difficult thing about this problem is understanding why Black 1 is wrong. White destroys the other eye with 2 and now there is no way for Black to get two eyes in the corner. If Black 'a', White 'b'; if instead Black 'c', then White 'd' — the reader should confirm for himself that Black cannot live.

Dia. 4. The virtue of Black 1 is that it sets up a second eye at 3.

(*'Let's Go'*, January 1983)

Simple Fuseki Theory


Honda Sachiko 6-dan

The aim of this series is not to present an overview of fuseki theory but to give you some idea of how to analyse specific problems that arise in the fuseki, such as the correct side for an approach move, how to choose between a pincer and a defending move, the right direction for an extension, and so on. We have tried to select examples with wide application, in the hope that we can abstract some general principles. Many amateurs tend to disregard fuseki, on the grounds that the game is really decided by fighting skill in the middle game, but we hope to make clear in this series that the judicious application of a few simple principles in the fuseki will put you in a position to fight on



advantageous terms in the middle game.

This first instalment deals with choosing the right side on which to make an approach move.



Simple Fuseki Theory: Answers


Continued from page 41

1. Choosing the Correct Approach Move


Choosing the correct side on which to make an approach move is sometimes easy: you simply follow the go proverb by playing on the wider or more open side. However, in cases like Problem 1 it's not so easy to tell which side has priority, so a little more analysis is called for.

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. In this position (from a game between amateur dan players), Black 1 is the correct move. If White 2, Black has room to stabilize his group by making a two-space extension to 5, so he can be satisfied. After White reinforces his isolated stone with 6, Black builds up his moyo by pressing at 7.



Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 2. If Black 1, White will be happy to build up his position at the top with 2 and 4. Black can of course settle his group with 3 and 5, but he is not satisfied. The reason is that 5 has no effect on the marked white stone, in contrast to 5 in Dia. 1.


Play an approach move on the wider side

When making an approach to a stone occupying the centre point of the corner, like the star-point or 3-3, it shouldn't make any difference — other things being equal — which side you play. Unless the overall position is symmetrical, however, one side will take precedence. The basic principle is to play an approach move on the wider side.



Dia. 1


Dia. 1. In this position, Black therefore plays at 1. After White 2, he builds up a large-scale position on the side with 3.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If Black enters at 1, White attacks with 2 and 4, and Black is unable to make the normal three-space extension from his two-stone wall because the marked white stone is in the way. He has just created a good target for White to attack.


Dia. 3. If Black has the marked stone in place, then things are different. He can now use his two-stone wall (1 and 3) to attack the isolated white stone with 5. In this case, White




Dia. 3

2 would be an overplay.

Dia. 4. When Black has the marked stone as an ally, White will probably just jump to 2. Black is happy because he can easily settle himself with 3 and 5, but still this is better for White than Dia. 3. In contrast to Black's capping move at 5 in Dia. 3, he at least gets to jump out with 6.




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5. If Black wants to make an approach move against a sanren-sei formation (three star-point stones in a row) at an early stage of the game, then approaching from the outside with 1 will generally be the move. If Black plays 1 at 'a', he gets a cramped position after White 'b', Black 2, White 'c'.

Dia. 6. The Chinese-style fuseki is a little different. Black can make an approach move on the inside because he has room to secure a base by extending to 5. The decision as to whether to approach on the inside or the outside will be influenced by the position in the direction of 'a'.




Dia. 6




he wants to force White to enter the corner so that he can build up a large moyo on the right side.

Dia. 2. Playing at the top with 1 is not interesting: White gets a low position at the top. Moreover, the presence of the marked white stone means that the top is open at the side, so Black did not have much potential for making territory there. That being the case, there is no need for White to be in a hurry to play there.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3


Dia. 3. In this kind of position, Black will play at 'b' rather than at 'a'. Since the position with the marked stones is already very strong, the only contribution playing at 'a' would make would be to add a little territory. Better to play at 'b' and try to drive White towards Black's strong position.

Dia. 4. In this case Black 'a' is a meaningful move. The marked black stones are weak, so Black 'a' reinforces them while attacking the



Dia. 4

white corner stone. Once having strengthened his position, Black can aim at the 3-3 invasion at 'b'. Black could also continue after Black 'a' with Black 'c', White 'b', Black 'd', but this would make him a little overconcentrated.




Dia. 1

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black's decision here will influence the whole subsequent course of the game. The correct approach move is Black 1, played on the more open side. If White defends with 2, Black can take up position at the bottom with 3. The point is not to be worried about White's taking territory on the left side.


Dia. 2. Playing at 1 shows that Black can't bear to let White get territory, but look at the position after 2. White is developing along the bottom and Black 1, floating adrift, looks like becoming a burden on Black. Of course, in some positions Black 1 might be the correct move, but here it's safe to say that 1 in Dia. 1 is superior.



Dia. 2


Dia. 3. If White has an extension in place at the bottom, then Black 1 is correct. Black can next stake out a position on the side with 3.

Dia. 4. If White has extensions in both di-



Dia. 3

rections, the shoulder hit of 1 looks good. Rather than making an approach move, Black considers the white position a moyo and sets out to



Dia. 4

reduce it.


(*'Let's Go'*, January 1985)

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?

Ishida Yoshio


We are all only too well aware of the disastrous mistakes that lose us games, but to the professional eye the typical amateur game is more notable for small mistakes in style and in tactical thinking. The accumulation of small losses throughout a game may be just as costly as a big mistake.

In this series, Ishida Yoshio runs some typical amateur mistakes through his computer and comes up with numerical values for them. When you know how much a habitual mistake is costing you, it may be easier to avoid making it.




Mistake 12

This is a typical handicap joseki. Black 2 is OK, but Black 4 is dubious. How many points does it cost Black?



Mistake 13

Black 2 is a mistake often made by weak kyu players. If it looks like good shape, you are hallucinating. How much does it lose you?




Mistake 14

The successive ataris of 1 and 3 are crude, but what do they actually cost Black?

Answers on page 46.

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?

Answers




Pattern 12: Black loses over 5 points.


This month we are looking at some common mistakes in a popular handicap joseki. The diagram above shows how we arrive at the position given in the problem. The moves here all look natural, yet the result is that Black suffers a loss of at least five points. Black may find it hard to believe that he's done anything wrong, but playing like this is what helps White to catch up in a handicap game.

The problem is with Black 11, but first we should demonstrate that Black really does lose points in the result here.

Dia. 1. Let's assume that the stones at White 1 and Black 2 are added. There is a perfect joseki to compare with this result.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. In this joseki White invades at 2 immediately. The moves to 10 are a joseki; at the right time White will want to add a stone at 'a' — the latter move is considered the honte (proper move). To continue —

Dia. 3. What do you think of Black 1 and 3? You must not believe that Black has gained by




Dia. 3

playing these moves in sente. Black 1 reduces his own liberties and loses a ko threat. It also eliminates various kinds of aji. Black 3 can hardly be recommended either: it just forces White to play where he wants to play anyway. If Black wants to build a large moyo from the top into the centre, then the correct procedure is to push down with 1 at 3, White 4, Black 'a'. Let's say that the bad moves of 1 and 3 lose three points.


If White later pushed up at 'a', answering with the empty triangle of Black 'b' would be ridiculous; we could consider it a loss of three points. That makes a total of six points, and this result is exactly the same as Dia. 1.

The comparison with the standard joseki in Dia. 2 makes it painfully clear that Black's play in Pattern 12 is slack. It loses over five points. The next question is how to improve on Black's play there.

Dia. 4. There is nothing wrong with Black 1; the mistake is blocking next at 'a'. The correct




Dia. 4



Dia. 5


move is the placement at 3; the moves to 6 follow. Alternatively —

Dia. 5. Black can also hane at 3. If White 4, Black crawls at 5; if next White 'a', Black attaches at 'b'. Both Dias. 4 and 5 are josekis that can be used in handicap play and in even games.



Pattern 13: Black loses about 3 points.


This pattern also arises from the double approach move at 2. Black 3 and 5 are joseki moves, but the contact play at 7 is terrible. Black may think that he has done well when he takes a grip on the white stone with 9, but he is fooling himself. White bites off the corner with 8 and 10 and still has the annoying threat of pulling out his stone with 'a'. That means that —



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Black has to add a stone at 1 immediately to secure his capture. The result is that Black has played one more stone than White. Since Black started out with a stone on the star-point and has played as many stones as White after that, he should have a definite lead, but the result in Dia. 1 is virtually equal (actually I think that Black is ahead, but it's only by a fraction), so something doesn't add up.


The virtues of Dia. 1 are that it's easy to understand and Black has thickness. Taking these factors into account, I evaluate the loss at three points. Building thickness is very important in handicap go, so I find it hard to penalize Dia. 1 more. Some readers may find it hard to reconcile this with the assignment of a five-



Dia. 2


point loss to Pattern 12, but that is how it strikes me. Of course, you would be laughed at by your opponent if you followed Pattern 13 in an even game.

Dia. 2. Let's look at the tsukenobi (attach-and-extend) joseki here for the purposes of comparison. Black might not want to attach at 1 here, but if he did the sequence to 7 is standard. Black 'a', aiming at the placement at 'b', becomes the vital point. The absurdity of Pattern 13 should be starting to become apparent now.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Let's assume that Black continued after Dia. 2 by playing 1 and 3. These moves are quite bad: they commit the folly of making a strong white position even stronger and they eliminate Black 'a' as a threat. Actually White would play 4 at 'a', but even if he did play here he would still have gained from the exchange. If we remove the marked stones (the exchange of which is almost equal) from the board, we get Dia. 1. That should be proof enough that Dia. 1 is bad.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. I also often see people make the bamboo joint of 2. When White plays 3 or 'a', this result is just as bad as Dia. 1, that is, it loses about three points. The marked white

Dia. 5. Blocking at 2 is the only move: nothing else makes sense. If White 3, Black 4 — you can find the continuation in any joseki book.



Pattern 14: Black 1 and 3 lose 1 point.

Dia. 1. This is the joseki. It is surprising the number of people who know it up to 9 but who fail to continue with the simple hane at 11.




Dia. 2. One follow-up Black can aim at is attacking from the centre with 1. If White ignores him, Black continues with 'a', which in turn aims at 'b'. Alternatively, Black could attack from the side with 1 at 'a' or 'c'. The drawback of 1 in Pattern 14 is that it eliminates these follow-up attacks.


Dia. 3. After Pattern 14, Black can aim at pressing at 1. White will defend at 2, so Black can then come back to 3, making a very strong shape. In a position in which this thickness worked effectively in attacking White or in building a moyo, there would be no reason to criticize Pattern 14. After 3 here, Black 'a' becomes a good point.



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Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 3 at 'a'. Moreover, in a game in which Black 5 in Pattern 14 is going to work well —

Dia. 5. White will probably play 1 the instant Black plays the marked stone. Even so, one cannot be dogmatic about the relative merits of this result and Dia. 1; the differences are subtle. I called Pattern 14 a one-point loss because I don't want the reader to follow it unthinkingly, but actually the loss is probably less than a point. There is no need to raise one's eyebrows over it.

Dia. 6. It's a mistake to think that we will




Dia. 6

get the same result as Pattern 14 if White plays 12 in Dia. 1 at 1 here. Instead of playing atari at 3, Black will cut at 2, then play 4 and 6 in sente. The sente hane—connection (White 6, White 4) should have been White's privilege here, so White's loss is too big to express numerically. If someone played like this, he would not be entitled to take white.

(*'Let's Go'*, June 1985)

Seki Quiz: Answer

Black is alive in A and has a seki in C. In position B, given below, he dies when White plays at 1. Black needs a stone at 1 to live.




Good Style and Correct Shape

Cho Chikun


From this instalment, Cho Chikun takes over as instructor from Rin. The theme is the same: acquiring the knowledge of style and shape necessary for you to make the right tactical

decisions in the give and take of the middle game. Usually the problem is not how to save a group but how to defend or attack with maximum efficiency.



Problem 13: Black to play

What is the correct way to capture the marked stone: Black 'a' or 'b'?



Problem 14: Black to play


How should Black capture the marked stone?

Answers on page 50

Good Style and Correct Shape: Answers

Answer to Problem 13

Dia. 1. This looks like a simple problem, but it is surprisingly difficult. One often sees people capture with Black 1, but this lets White make use of the captured stone in his play in the centre. To wit —




Dia. 1: wrong

Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If White later plays the marked stone, White 1 becomes an effective forcing move. If Black 'a', White is delighted to be able to play 'b' in sente, but if Black simply plays 'c', there is no getting away from the fact that he has been forced to answer submissively.

Dia. 3. The correct answer is Black 1. A white stone at 'a' will now have no effect whatsoever on Black. White 'b' forces Black 'c', but this is a trifling endgame problem; there is no need to worry about it now.




Dia. 3: correct

Dia. 4: correct

Dia. 4. The idea of Black 1 here is similar: Black makes a solid shape with no aji for White to exploit.

Dia. 5. If Black 1, White 2 will be annoying. If next Black 'a', White 'b', then Black has only one eye, so his group could come under pressure. Black 1 at 'c' of course also makes White 2 a good move.




Dia. 5: wrong

Dia. 6

Making good shape

Dia. 1. What is the best way to capture the white stone? Most players seeing this shape for the first time would consider the conservative move of 'a' or the somewhat greedy move of 'b', but —

Dia. 2. Neither is good. Correct is the diagonal move of 1. White will not want to permit Black to hane at 'a' next, so he will atari at 2, but this is just what Black wants, as he gets a good, solid shape with 3.




Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 3: wrong

Dia. 3. What is the difference from Black 1? If White hanes at 'a' and Black blocks at 'b', we get the same result. The problem is that White won't hane at 'a'.


Dia. 4. If White is going to continue playing here later, then descending to the second line (the marked stone) is an effective move. This sets up the endgame move of 1.

If we compare this result to Dia. 2, we see that if White connects at 'a' there, he sets up a sente hane and connection, but Black ends up with more points in the corner. Moreover —



Dia. 4

Dia. 5



Dia. 6


Dia. 5. Another difference is that Black can capture a stone with 1 and 3. In a position like the one shown here, Black could further aim at playing a ko with 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. This would not be possible if Black made a hane to

the left of 'a' in Dia. 3, then connected.


Dia. 6. If Black descends at 1, White will probably block at 2 immediately. If Black does nothing, White can squeeze with 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', yet defending with Black 'b' makes White 2 sente, which is painful.

Answer to Problem 14


Dia. 1. Black 1 is solid; its drawback is that it does not give Black much help in developing towards the left. If White later plays 'a', then the threat of White 'b' will be a nuisance.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 2. Playing Black 1, forgetting about the canons of shape, is the most flexible approach. This not only works well towards the left but also stabilizes Black because of its low position. If White gets a stone at 'a' or 'b', then White 'c' becomes a threat, but 'a' or 'b' is not the kind of place White wants to play anyway.

Dia. 3. In this case one hesitates to play the geta of 1, standard move though it is, because White gets a good forcing move at 'a'. Black 'b' will make Black overconcentrated.

(*'Kido'*, July 1986)

5th Women's Honinbo Title

Last year was a busy year for Ogawa Tomoko: she had her first child, a girl, and also found time to win her first title in six years. When she realized she was pregnant, she pulled out of all tournaments except the Women's Honinbo. In this she kept winning, but it only involved playing six games throughout the year, including the title match, so it was not too much of a burden. Her baby was born in August, which gave her a couple of months to recuperate before the title match. When she won the title with straight wins, the inevitable slogan adopted by the press was 'mother power'.

From 1976 to 1980, the Women's Championship Tournament, the predecessor to this tournament (it was informally known as the Women's Honinbo, which became the official name of the new tournament established in 1982), was dominated by the two Kitani school contemporaries Ogawa Tomoko (born in April 1951) and Kobayashi Chizu 5-dan (born in August 1954) — Chizu held the title from 1976 to 1978 and Tomoko in 1979 and 1980 — but then it was taken over for five years by the Honda sisters, Honda Sachiko 6-dan and Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan (the oldest Honda sister

is the only Japanese woman 8-dan, Sugiuchi Kazuko, who held the Women's Championship title from 1953 to 1956).

Ogawa's victory may stimulate her friend and rival Chizu to try for a comeback; in any case, no younger women players in Japan have yet emerged who seem capable of launching a challenge to them or to the Honda group.

To see how Ogawa Tomoko did it, here are the games from the title match, beginning with a detailed commentary on the deciding game.



The title holder, Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan

Game Two

White: Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan, Women's Honinbo

Black: Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan

Komi: 5½; time: 5 hours each

Played on 19 November 1986 at the Nihon Ki-in.

Commentary by Konishi Taizo 6-dan.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50). *Ogawa takes an early lead.*

Ogawa likes the opening pattern to 11, in which she takes a solid grip on two corners. With Black going for territory, White naturally expands her moyo with 22. Black starts to reduce the moyo with 25 and 27, but switches back to territory when White counters with 28.

The first fight starts with 37 when Black refuses to answer a forcing move passively. In playing 36 Kusunoki had undoubtedly expected Black 1 in Dia. 1; after forcing with 2 White could then attack at 4. Black 37 must have taken her by surprise and no wonder — this might be the first time it's been played in a position like this.

White 38 is the fighting answer; if at 1 in Dia. 2, White cannot omit 3, so she ends in gote, which was not her plan when she attached at 36.

Destroying Black's corner territory is big, but Black wipes out White's centre influence. This was White's biggest, in fact, her only, asset, so the result seems to favour Black. That could mean that 37 was the winning move.

Black 41 is an important move. If Black plays at 1 in Dia. 3, White can get a ko up to 18.





Figure 2 (51 - 100)


Figure 2 (51 - 100). *A temporary recovery*

Black seizes the initiative in the centre but loses it with 79. White regains her edge there when she extends at 82, for she can now aim at separating Black by playing at 'a'. Black should just have connected at 80 with 79.

White 90 is a mistake. If instead White exchanged 'b' for Black 'c', then secured the bottom area with 'd', the game might have turned in her favour. She could then have aimed at exploiting the thinness of the centre black group.

Black 91 is the biggest point on the board.

Black 95 is the vital point; it's very hard for



Dia. 4

Dia. 5

White to find a good answer, but even so 96 is too mild. Bad style though it is, White should consider resisting with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4. With 99, her second blow at a vital point, Black starts to take command.




Figure 3 (101 – 145)

21: ko (left of 18)

Figure 3 (101 – 145). *The lead fluctuates.*

Black 3 is a good move; it lightens the burden of the ko and menaces the eye shape of the white group on the top left. Hereafter, White is kept on the defensive.

Black 27. A mistake, probably due to time trouble (both players were in byo-yomi). Capturing with 36 instead would have decided the game.

When White cuts at 28, Black can't omit 31; with 32 White settles her group and secures six points here, so the game is starting to look like an upset. Note that Black 29 has now become a bad move.

Black tries to recoup her fortunes with 33 and 37 and this time White goes wrong. Docilely making eyes with 38 to 44 is too placid; it lets




Figure 4 (146 – 200)

98: connects (left of 58)




Figure 5 (201 – 292)

Ko (over 26): 33, 36, 39, 42, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 71; 75: at 5; 78: at 24; 81: at 5; 84: at 24; 85: connects (at 26); 91: connects (left of 31); 92: connects (at 5)

Black make excellent shape up to 45. White should have played more boldly, with 38 at 1 in Dia. 5.

Figure 4 (146 – 200), Figure 5 (201 – 292). *Kusunoki a shade behind*

White fights to the bitter end, but the issue seems to have been decided by the end of Figure 3. Ogawa: 'A number of times along the way I thought that I had lost, but each time I made an



Ogawa has a good year, both on the career and home fronts.

effort to regain my composure and fight on.' Kusunoki was cheerful enough after the game — she had also done her best.

Black wins by 4½ points.

Game One

White: Ogawa Tomoko

Black: Kusunoki Teruko

Played on 5 November 1986 at the Nihon Ki-in.

Figure 1 (1 – 100)

The game seems good for Black when she secures eye shape by playing 61 in sente. Black 69 is perhaps dubious: defending at the bottom with 'a' would be bigger.

White seizes her chance with 76. When Black has to eke out a cramped life up to 87 the game becomes close.

Going in too far with 99 seems to have been




Figure 1 (1 – 100)




Figure 2 (101 – 170)

the losing move. When White resists with 100, Black fails to get a satisfactory result, as seen in Figure 2. Ogawa: 'The game was more or less close, but if Black had used 99 to reduce the moyo with 'b', I would have lacked confidence.'

Figure 2 (101 – 170)

Black is put on the spot when White pushes up with 6. After being forced to live small with 9 to 13, she has little chance of winning.

Black resigns after White 170.

('Kido', February 1987)

Women's Honinbo Title

First prize: ¥3,600,000

Second prize: ¥1,000,000

Match fee – title holder: ¥500,000

challenger: ¥330,000

26 players participated in the 1986 tournament: 19 from the Nihon Ki-in and 7 from the Kansai Ki-in. Ogawa had to win 5 games in a row (the first was played in 1985) to become challenger. Ogawa won the Women's Championship in 1979 (she took the title from Kobayashi Chizu) and 1980.

Go and Music: Two Fine Arts

by Jonathan Wood

As can be seen on every *Go World* cover, go has long been a popular motif in the Japanese art world, but has had little connection with the arts in the West. That has changed now, thanks to the efforts of American composer-pianist Haskell Small. Small has created a piece based on an actual game and will premiere it this summer at the U.S. Go Congress. I recently had the opportunity to speak with Small in Tokyo about it and his go/music experiences.

Born in 1948, Small grew up, or, as he puts it, is still growing up, in the Washington, D.C. area. His mother was a musician and his father an army colonel. He started playing the piano around seven or eight, but never had any serious training until he was in his teens. 'I frustrated one beginning piano teacher. She gave up on me. I wanted to do it my way.'

He learned to play by ear and couldn't even read music until he was eighteen. His background was unusual in another way. 'Most people,' he says, 'if they're going to make a change, have classical training and then go into jazz. I did it the other way. I grew up playing jazz and rock.'

He entered Carnegie-Mellon University as an electrical-engineering student, but dropped out and moved to San Francisco. He began his serious music training there at the San Francisco Conservatory of Music before transferring back to Carnegie-Mellon, where he earned a Bachelor of Fine Arts degree.

Small won the Pittsburgh Concert Society



Haskell Small, pianist/composer/go player

Auditions at age twenty-one, after which he toured Europe. In the U.S. he has played at Carnegie Hall, the National Gallery of Art, and the Kennedy Center. He has won numerous awards as a pianist and has composed 'two to three dozen' pieces for piano as well as for other instruments and voices. He is also on the faculty of the Washington Conservatory.



*Haskell gives a mini-recital at the Closing Ceremony
of the 9th World Amateur Go Championship in Beijing.*

How did such an accomplished musician become interested in go? It started in college. 'I had a friend that liked go and I was into chess at the time. He insisted that I learn to play go and I insisted that he play chess with me. We reluctantly alternated playing games. I hated go. I didn't understand it, I didn't know anything about it. That lasted fifteen or twenty games and I never looked at it again until six years later,' Small relates.

That next occasion was about six years ago at a family gathering, when Small's brother-in-law asked him if he knew how to play go. Small replied that he had played a little in the past. 'Then suddenly something clicked and I loved the game. I couldn't get enough of it.'

He learned by playing a lot of games and doing some studying. He is currently ranked at 1-dan in the U.S. and is the president of the Greater Washington Go Club, which has a membership of about sixty. Although he has no official position in the American Go Association, it was his idea to stage the First United States Go

Congress in 1985. 'I was the dreamer that pushed the practical people into saying let's give it a try. And I did all the hard work to go with it,' he comments.

Small also attended the 9th World Amateur Go Championship held in May in Beijing as a guest official, and performed an impromptu mini-recital during the closing ceremony.

Like every go player, Small finds an appeal in go, and like many of us, he says it's difficult to put it into words. 'I don't know, it's just beautiful. Something about the nebulousness of it attracted me, the way it kind of flows, as opposed to chess, which is in slots, rigid. Go seemed a lot looser and freer, though also well-disciplined, of course. It's balanced. You can't be too aggressive or too passive.'

The concept of balance is very important to Small. Because of it, go seems less competitive to him than other games. 'In chess it's more brute force. It's more "go for the kill," while in go there's always a feeling, at least in a well-played professional game, of the competition almost

being in the background.'

Small also finds go relevant to life. 'I think any art is a representation of life. Most people say "go is like life," but I have a friend who says "life is like go." I don't go that far, but I very much believe that go can represent personal struggles, or other aspects of life.' He adds, 'It shows one's personality. You can see someone trying for too much or being a little chicken or showing bravado. It says whatever one person is trying to be within given skill limits.'

Perhaps it was inevitable that Small would combine two of his main interests. He spoke on his composition about go with pleasure. It's for two pianos (and a video screen), and is as yet unnamed. 'I mentioned it to a Japanese man here and he said why not call it "Igo Concerto," but in America that would come off as "ego," so I'm not sure I want to use it. I will probably end up calling it something matter-of-fact like "A Game of Go,"' he says.

The game Small chose to represent was number six of the sanjubango played between Ota Yuzo and Honinbo Shusaku on February 25, 1853. There were 265 moves and the game ended in jigo. (The game record and a commentary can be found in *Invincible: The Games of Shusaku* by John Power and available from the Ishi Press.)

'It's a setting, if you will, in the same fashion as choreography in music. A choreographer "sets" the music by listening to it and creating in dance the feeling that the music gives him. It's the same process that I'm attempting to do with go, in which I'm, move by move, setting what I interpret as the feeling and flow of the game. For example, the ko fight in the middle has a certain theme. There is a tension involved between the two pianos, the idea being that they represent black and white.'

Small chose two pianos because he wanted equal instruments, again following the idea of balance, which is also why he selected a game ending in a draw. 'I particularly chose a game that was jigo because I wanted to stress the aspect of the two competitors being partners, sharing in creating a beautiful game. The fact that it ends in jigo is a declaration of the best game possible, despite the fact that there were a

few plays considered mistakes.'

He has set almost every single move of the game. 'I've written the score with parts for Piano 1 and Piano 2 and then on a third staff for moves number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and so on. The idea is that a third person is needed to perform it, someone who would sit at a computer keyboard. We have a program set up so that all he has to do is punch a button and the next move will be displayed on a large video screen.'

It will be about ten minutes long. 'A lot of it's pretty rapid fire, although some of it's more relaxed. It's kind of dense in that way and I suspect it might go right through some people on first hearing.' For this reason he hopes to videotape the performance and make it available to be seen repeatedly.

Small hasn't created this work just for the enjoyment of go players. 'My goal is to have it be a viable musical composition without any knowledge of go or even knowing a go game is going on being necessary to enjoy it. If somebody does know about go, I guess he'll get more out of it.'


Small didn't find it a particularly difficult composition, perhaps because he finds go and music to be very similar. 'I see them both very much as arts and both viable. I don't think either one is more "true" than the other in any sense, but from the aspect of refinement, both good music and go have some kind of craft involved. A finely played professional go game has deep thought. The flow of the stones, I think, lends itself very naturally to music.'

He adds, 'The other thing I'm trying to do, which is the nebulous part of it, is portray the feeling involved in go. In the beginning, for example, the stones are widely spaced and then a shimari, to me, adds a little more something. Then there's an extension that reaches out and a fight starts and that creates tension. All this, I think, can be portrayed in music.'


Small, who has an orchestral composition scheduled to be completed in the fall, has no immediate plans for future go—music works, but does not rule them out. It will be interesting to see how this piece is received in the music and go worlds. At the very least it should help spread an awareness of go in the West, perhaps on a major scale.

Handicap Corner

Dia. 1. This is a common position in handicap go. Instead of making the standard invasion at 'a', White tries to confuse Black with 1. How should Black respond?



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Dia. 2. If Black plays 1, White will probably continue with 2 and 4. Naturally he expects Black to go wrong in handling the crosscut.

Dia. 3. Black 1 and 3 aim to keep the white stones separated, which is understandable, but they let White take too much profit in the corner. This is a failure for Black. Instead of 3 —

Dia. 4. Black should block in the corner at 1. White must play 2, but Black follows up with the sacrifice of 3. White is forced to play 4, helping Black to connect at 5, so Black captures at the top with 7 and 9, gaining a superior result.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 5. If White tenukis on the side (he will of course omit 8 in Dia. 4), Black 1 is severe, as it forces White to live in gote and cuts off the marked stone.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. Alternatively, Black could go for the side profit with 3 and 5 here. Whether he follows Dia. 4 or Dia. 6, White suffers for not making the standard invasion.

Dia. 7. If White tries the crosscut in this position, Black 4 is the standard move, but 6 is a bad move for the same reason as in Dia. 3. Instead —



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

12: connects

Dia. 8. The 1-3 combination is better. If White 4, Black captures the corner stones with 5 to 13.

(*'Let's Go'*, January 1984)


The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan


How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. Black has just attached with the triangled stone in the upper left corner, and three proposals are being made for White's next move. Which one do you think fits the fuseki best?




Honda Kunihisa



Dia. A



Dia. C




Dia. B

A: I see no problem if White plays the ordinary move at 1. Notice, too, he already has a stone in place in the lower left. There is no need to be clever in this position.

B: I disagree. White should hane on the outside so that he can develop at the top. If you look carefully at the left side, you'll realize that Black can't attack there anyway.

C: I can't stand listening to these gutless ideas. Although it's usually poor style, White 1 in this case is a powerful move. It's the only move for getting a fight started.



Fuseki Diagram

Fuseki Analysis

Since josekis work effectively in a certain direction, it is necessary to examine the positions along the adjacent sides and in the adjacent corners when choosing a joseki for a particular opening. Positions in the opposite corner are usually only a factor when a ladder is involved. In this issue's fuseki (Fuseki Diagram), the positions along the left side and at the top will determine the choice of joseki.


In the upper left, White has pincerd the circled black stone with the circled white stone, and Black has answered by attaching with the triangled stone. If one considers only the corner, White has the initiative, but if one considers the entire left side, Black has the advantage, four stones to three. Also note that the higher position of the marked black stone in the lower left corner means that Black can press down at 'a' on the marked white stone at any time.

Because of Black's overall strength on the left side, there is little advantage in White's trying to start a fight there. White should instead treat the area lightly and be satisfied with getting sabaki.

In the top right corner, the relation of the black and white stones is just the opposite of that in the lower left: White's position is more powerful because he can press at 'b'. Since the influence White gains by pressing works along the top, the top becomes an area where he wants to develop.

White must therefore choose a joseki that (1)

emphasizes the top and (2) treats the left side as a light area.



Dia. 1

B Wins the Debate


The correct move for this issue's fuseki is the hane in Dia. 1; the other two moves hurt White's chances.

After White 1, the pattern to 4 is fixed. Black 4 is good shape because it makes miai of 'a' and 6. In this fuseki, White wants to develop along the top, so he plays 5. When Black presses at 6, he jumps lightly to 7, creating a flexible shape. If White can now steer the game safely toward the yose, the fuseki will have been a success for him.


Before looking at possible continuations for Dia. 1, we will study the joseki in isolation.

This issue's joseki arises when Black approaches at 1 in Dia. 2, White pincers at 2, and Black attaches at 3. The purpose of 3 is to settle the shape quickly.

White's choices after 3 are 'a', 'b', and 'c'. The common move is the inside hane at 'a'. The outside hane at 'b' is usually played as part of



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


a larger strategy. Pushing up at 'c' has traditionally been regarded as a trick move, but that opinion is not widely held nowadays.

When White chooses the outside hane at 1 in Dia. 3, the continuation to 7 is usual. White jumps lightly to 7 because crawling at 'a' would make his stones heavy. Since he has already emphasized the top by playing 5, his only concern on the left is to be able take care of his stones easily (sabaki), even though this may mean letting Black have his way a bit.

Black can immediately settle the shape with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4, although, as we shall see later, he has a severer (and recently more popular) way of playing. After Black 3, White has no appealing continuation (see Dias. 5 and 8), so he tenukis, leaving the problem of how to continue to Black.




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

If, for example, White continues with 1 in Dia. 5, he is immediately in trouble when Black cuts at 2. If White captures with 3 in Dia. 6, he is forced to live in the sequence to 9 in Dia. 7, while Black builds a strong position with 10 (if the ladder at 'a' in Dia. 6 favors Black, he gets a good result by playing 6 at 'a').


If instead of extending at 1 in Dia. 5 White connects at 1 in Dia. 8, Black develops



Dia. 6




Dia. 7




Dia. 8


smoothly with 2 and takes the initiative. White's position, however, is too low.




Dia. 9



Dia. 10




Dia. 11




Dia. 12

Instead of 3 in Dia. 4, Black also has the severe cut at 3 in Dia. 9. White's strongest reply is capturing with 1 and 3 in Dia. 10, but it is unreasonable. Black grips the white stone on the outside with 4 (if the ladder is not good for him, he can still fight by pulling back at 'a'), then backs off at 6 in Dia. 11 when White pushes up at 5 (blocking immediately at 7 lets White play 'a'). If White then cuts at 9, Black ataris at 10 in Dia. 12 and connects at 12. If White cuts instead at 'b' in Dia. 11, Black connects at 9. Either way the fight is rough going for White.




Dia. 13



Dia. 14

White has an easier time of it if he connects at 4 in Dia. 13, then extends down the side. Note that in this shape White can reduce Black to only one eye by extending at 1 in Dia. 14. If after the Black 2—White 3 exchange Black extends at 'a', White hanes at 'b'. If he ataris at 'c' instead, White ataris at 'd'.

Note also that if Black first hanes and descends with the two marked stones in Dia. 15, White has a clever yose tesuji combination in 1 and 3.




Dia. 15

Dia. 16

After Black 3 in Dia. 13, it is also conceivable in certain circumstances for White to tenuki, waiting for the right opportunity to atari at 'a' in Dia. 16. If he does so, Black 'b' becomes an excellent move.

After 1 in Dia. 17, it would be a mistake for Black to cut on the outside, at 3. White is only too happy to get eye shape where in Dia. 13 he had none by capturing with 4 and 6. (With an eye, he might be able to switch elsewhere.)




Dia. 17

Dia. 18

Black can also go wrong if he switches 3 in Dia. 4 to 3 in Dia. 18. This is a fundamental bad move whose deficiency is exposed when White extends to 4.


As we noted before, Black 4 in Dia. 19 makes miai of the top and the side. If White chooses to defend the side with 5, Black must take the vital point at 6 at the top. Continuing with 1 and 3 in Dia. 20 is senseless, but White has a tesuji at 7



Dia. 19

Dia. 20


in Dia. 21 that rescues him. Nevertheless, his position remains painfully low in the continuation through 11 in Dia. 22. When Black then takes sente to attack at 12 on the side, White's result can hardly be called good.



Dia. 21

Dia. 22


When White attaches at 1, Black may resist strongly with 2 in Dia. 23. The sequence to 9 results in a ko, with it being Black's turn to take at 'a'. In most cases, however, Black will follow Dia. 22, since he has no reason to be dissatisfied with the result there.



Dia. 23

This concludes our study of this issue's joseki. It is now time to return to the problem of how to continue after White 7 in Dia. 1.


Black's best bet seems to be cutting with 8 and 10 in Dia. 24 (the ladder favors Black). White will connect at 11, then defend at 13 when



Dia. 24


Black ataris at 12. White could also defend at 'a', but it is not clear whether this move is better than 13.

In the result to 13, White can claim success because he has comfortably settled his stones within Black's sphere of influence. Moreover, at the top, his triangled stone has become a good approach move that works well with the circled stone.



Dia. 25

The 1-3 combination in Dia. 25 in place of Black 8 and 10 in Dia. 24 would be the wrong follow-up in this fuseki. If Black now cuts at 'a' after White 4, White, instead of connecting at 'b', will switch to 'c' at the bottom or one



Dia. 26

of the points marked 'd' in the upper right. Because of Black's lukewarm play, White's quick development will put him in the lead.


Since Black cannot afford to cut at 'a', White can aim at destroying Black's eye shape with 'b' or 'e'. This disagreeable prospect is the reason Black first cuts at 10 in Dia. 24. Because White does not want to let Black play 11, he connects himself at 11 immediately. The connection gives Black time to play 12.

Dia. 26 shows what happens if White crawls at 2 instead of jumping lightly to 4 as in the joseki pattern. Up to 7 White is confined to the side while Black builds powerful thickness. Black could also give White a jolt by blocking his path with 3 at 'a'.


A's Proposal

A proposed the inside hane at 1 in Dia. 27. Black 2 and White 3 next are essential. Black then plays in at 4, which is the feature of this pattern. Black's intention is to use this stone as a sacrifice.


Although White can atari from underneath at 'a', it is more usual to atari from above with 5 in Dia. 28. Black adds a stone to the



Dia. 27



Dia. 28




Dia. 29


sacrifice with 6, and White strengthens his stones with 7 and 9. Black then captures a white stone with 10 in Dia. 29, and White completes the capture of the two sacrifice stones with 11. The joseki ends with the forced exchange of 12 for 13.

Because White has played one more move (Black has sente), he has gained more locally.

Black must be careful of the timing of the forcing move in Dia. 29. If he forces too early at 1 in Dia. 30 (next page), he ends with gote because White will not need to add a move at 'a'.




Dia. 30



Dia. 31

From White's point of view, White 11 in Dia. 29 is necessary. If he were to connect at 2 in Dia. 31 in answer to Black 1, Black would play 'b' in sente because he would no longer want to play 'a'.




Dia. 32

The result of playing out the joseki in Dia. 29 in this issue's fuseki is shown in Dia. 32. Black ends the joseki with sente, which he must use to press at 1. If White jumps out to 2, Black pincers at 3 and takes the lead. If White prevents the pincer with 2 at 'a', Black blocks at 'b'. White's prospects are dim.

Black 1 is the key point. Because of it, White loses all hope of making a moyo on the left. If it had been White's turn to play, he would have staked out a superb moyo with 'c'.


What if White ataris from underneath, at 2 in Dia. 33? Exchanging 3 for 4 before connecting at 5 is the correct order of moves for Black. White 6 is then unavoidable, after which Black settles the shape with 7 through 11. With sente, Black pincers with 13 for a result similar to that in Dia. 32.




Dia. 33

C's Proposal


C proposed 1 in Dia. 34, a move traditionally regarded as a trick move. After Black 2, White cuts at 3, his aim when he played 1. If Black then ataris at 1 in Dia. 35 and lives in the corner in the sequence to 6, he will indeed have been tricked, as White's outside thickness is clearly superior to Black's profit. Black might try to put his one stone on the outside in motion with 'a', but he will only create a target for attack when White answers at 'b'.




Dia. 34



Dia. 35



Dia. 36




Dia. 37

The tesuji for avoiding White's trap is the hane at 1 in Dia. 36. If White blocks at 2, Black ataris at 3 and adds a second stone at 5 in Dia. 37 as a sacrifice. White captures the sacrifice


stones with 6 and 8, but Black also captures two stones with 7 and 9. The result, however, is not at all even because the triangled white stone has become an outright loss.

Since White cannot block at 2 in Dia. 36, he must atari at 2 in Dia. 38 and connect at 4. Black cannot reasonably move out with his two stones, so he extends at 5 in Dia. 39. The moves to 8 then follow. The local result is even.

If the ladder is good for White, he could consider playing 6 at 8, but then there would be the difficult problem of the ladder break.




Dia. 38




Dia. 39

In this issue's fuseki, the joseki will proceed uneventfully to White 9 (or 'a') in Dia. 40. Black has sente, however, and will use it to press at 10, a move we have seen before. When White jumps to 11, Black settles the shape in the sequence to 17. Black has no qualms about giving White this much territory on the side because it makes the thickness he has built to 9 ineffective. With 18, Black has good prospects. (Black could, if he wanted to, omit the moves on the left and play 18 immediately.)

Instead of accepting the result in Dia. 40,




Dia. 40




Dia. 41


White might choose a fighting variation by descending at 4 in Dia. 41. Black's only reply is 5, which White answers with 6. Next, Black 7 is a tesuji: if White plays 'a', Black plays 'b'; if White plays 'c', Black plays 'a'. This is a fight Black should be able to handle.



Dia. 42



Dia. 43



Dia. 44

For reference, consider the joseki pattern that starts with the moves in Dia. 42. The moves that follow to 8 are all strong moves. When Black hanes at 9 in Dia. 44, White blocks at 'a' or cuts at 'b', either move giving him a squeeze. Although the joseki is difficult and there is a ladder to be considered, the essential point is that both 'a' and 'b' are usual moves. But White would not play 10, which gives the same shape that he has gotten through 4 in Dia. 41. This difference makes the fight in Dia. 41 somewhat unreasonable for him.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'*, September 1980. Translated by David Thayer.)

Note: This is the final article of the 24 articles in 'The Great Joseki Debate' series. Readers can find the other 23 articles in GW17-23, 26-30, 32, 35, 37-8, 41-6, and 48.



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